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Γ/ie ACP-EU Courier is the voice 
of the ACP-EU partnership in 
political, economic and social 
cooperation. This relationship can be 
traced back 45 years to the Treaty of 
Rome. The two sides have set up 
joint institutions and are involved in 
an ongoing political dialogue. 
The partnership was last renewed on 
23 June 2000 with the signing of the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 
covering a 20-year period. 
As well as the political dimension, 
this agreement provides for intense 
cooperation in the trade area as the 
EU seeks to ensure that the ACP 
countries do not suffer 
marginalisation in the current 
multilateral trade negotiations 
(Doha Round). 
The partnership has always focused 
on development assistance which 
targets the twin objectives of 
poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. 
Giving voice to men and women 
from ninety-three EU and ACP 
countries across the globe facing 
the future in a spirit of partnership: 
that is our mission. 
Editorial 
HIV/AIDS: doubt and hope 
Recognised as the most fatal pandemic known to humanity in the last six 
centuries, AIDS continues to cause devastation in the world. Figures in the 
UNAIDS report published on 22 September 2003 make stark reading, 
especially concerning Africa. This continent alone has three quarters (30 out 
of 40 million) of the people in the world with HIV/AIDS. In 2002, 3.5 million 
new infections were reported, and approximately 2.5 million people died, 
bringing to more than 15 million African victims of the epidemic since its 
appearance. Ten million of those infected are young people from 15 to 24 
years old, and three million are less than 15 years old. In certain countries, 
40 per cent of adults are infected by the disease. Behind these sobering 
figures are the many devastating socio-economic consequences of the 
pandemic. Development indicators such as life expectancy have moved back 
in the seriously affected countries. The population pyramid is being radically 
altered, with a small number of young adults - the group that has 
traditionally provided care for both children and the elderly - supporting 
large numbers of young and old people. According to UNAIDS, the future 
of millions of orphaned children is compromised and could be a source of 
instability if action is not taken. 
In recent years initiatives to fight the disease have multiplied. New strategies 
have been set up through national plans to fight AIDS and some - all too 
few - countries obtained good results. However, the current response is not 
commensurate with the gravity of the situation. 
For instance, less than a third of young people in the worst-affected 
countries use condoms with non-regular sexual partners. Access to life 
saving drugs for HIV/AIDS is now considered a crucial element of the 
comprehensive response to control this epidemic. But less than five per cent 
of the people who need these medicines have access to them - and fewer 
than one per cent in the worst affected areas in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
percentage is even lower when it comes to the simple one-dose treatment 
during labour, which could have prevented half the 800,000 infant 
infections last year. 
During a major AIDS conference in Kenya's capital Nairobi this September, 
participants deplored delays in gaining access to treatment and in allocating 
sufficient funds. Of the annual $10 billion estimated as the amount needed 
by the international community at the historic UN session on HIV/AIDS in 
2001, only $4.5 has been pledged. Without a substantial increase in 
resources, the chance to control AIDS will vanish. The recent WTO decision 
to facilitate developing country access to generic low-cost treatments is a 
small glimmer of hope. But all depends on the way this measure is applied 
and the resources mobilised. 
The fight against AIDS in the world and particularly in Africa is above all a 
question of political will - of the rich countries but also of the affected 
countries. The $200 billion for the fight against terrorism, mobilised in 2003 
alone, shows what is possible if one agrees to go to the trouble. meeting point: Shashi Tharoor 
il  The UN is much better 
at 
en 
Deacekeeping than at peace 
orcement" 
Shashi Tharoor has worked in the United Nations since 1978 in various capacities. 
Beginning his career at the High Commissioner for Refugees, he was then deeply 
involved in several UN peacekeeping operations, such as the one in the former 
Yugoslavia. He was then executive assistant to Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Since 
June 2002 he has been UN Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public 
Information, responsible for the UN's external communications and media relations. 
Tharoor is also an acclaimed writer. He spoke to the Courier while in Brussels in the 
context of the reorganisation of the UN's Department of Public Information. 
Dorothy Morrissey 
Following the war in 
Iraq there is an ongoing 
debate about the 
legitimacy of that war 
and the occupation, and 
the role of the UN. Can 
you comment on that 
and the lessons to be 
learned? 
Those are all rather large 
issues. First, we mustn't lose 
sight of the fact that there 
must have been a hundred 
wars since the Second World 
War which did not involve 
Security Council authorisa-
tion: only twice in its 58-year 
history has the Council actu-
ally authorised war, once in 
Korea, and the first Gulf War, 
Desert Storm, when a mem-
ber state had essentially swal-
lowed up another member 
state of the UN. So it would 
Security Council by its failure 
which has not been amongst the principal yardsticks for 
its success over the years. Second, as far as Iraq is con-
cerned, 17 times before the war the Council had agreed 
on issues relating to Iraq, and almost immediately after 
the war the issue came back to the Council. There was a 
precedent four years ago when NATO bombed the for-
mer Yugoslavia over Kosovo without reference to the 
Security Council, and got the Council to approve the 
arrangements that followed. So this would not be the first 
time that the UN was irrelevant to a war, but fundamen-
tally relevant to the ensuing peace, and that's ultimately 
where the UN needs to be judged, on the contributions it 
makes to improving the lives of ordinary human beings. 
be unfair to judge the 
to agree on something 
Peace and security else-
where in the world have been 
effectively maintained by the 
same Security Council. 
During the eight or nine 
weeks that they were dis-
agreeing most ferociously 
over Iraq, the same Council 
members were agreeing on a 
whole host of other issues, 
from Côte d'Ivoire to Congo, 
Cyprus, East Timor, 
Afghanistan and so on. The 
Council's agenda is much 
larger than any one country, 
and indeed the UN's agenda 
is much larger than the 
Council's. 
As far as Congo is 
concerned, UN 
peacekeepers deployed 
there appeared unable 
to protect the civilians, in a situation the UN 
warned could turn into a Rwanda-type 
genocide. Why did the Secretary-General have 
to call on outside forces to intervene? 
The mandate of the UN force was not to protect the 
population. The force was given an extremely modest 
mandate, to observe the implementation of a peace 
agreement. They were not there to protect the general 
population, which would have required a far larger force, 
far better armed and equipped. But I would agree that it 
was a rather ill-conceived mandate in the circumstances, 
and many of us in the UN felt so at the time. But that is 
the mandate the Council gave us, so we needed to turn 
to an outside force to come in with robust, credible 
strength. The UN in any case is much better at peace-
© 
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keeping than at peace enforcement. Peace enforcement is 
something that you really need war fighters to do; we are 
peacekeepers, not war fighters, we don't call upon coun-
tries to come in to make war on our behalf, we call upon 
them to come in to help uphold the peace. 
Another example was Sierra Leone where the 
UK intervened, and Liberia where the US 
intervened. Are we seeing the emergence of a 
new kind of peacekeeping, where a particular 
country gets involved, then hands over 
to the UN? 
I don't want to generalise to that point, because we have 
an excellent record in Africa of pure UN peacekeeping; 
for instance in Mozambique in the early to mid 1990s, 
where we ended the civil war, held free elections, dis-
armed the combatants, and left a government in place 
which has now become one of the success stories in that 
region. We are now on the Eritrea/Ethiopia border, hav-
ing brought an end to a savage war, which reminded peo-
ple in many ways of the trench warfare of the First World 
War. We managed to police a bloodless stalemate in 
Western Sahara, and so on. So I don't want to suggest that 
going in with outside countries is the only way the UN 
can do peacekeeping in Africa. But there are some situa-
tions in which the rapid and robust application of mili-
tary force requires a country to accept a certain responsi-
bility that may be more difficult to expect from countries 
far away who come in to serve the UN cause when there 
is a peace agreement. The three interventions you are 
alluding to - the French in the Congo, the British in 
Sierra Leone, and the Americans in Liberia - all involved 
situations where the fighting was still going on, and 
where a credible, extremely well-armed force was needed 
to restore order. There has been a very interesting prece-
dent outside Africa, in East Timor, when the Australians, 
immediately after the Council resolution, led a very 
robust force, rapidly established law and order and then 
handed over to a UN peacekeeping force which contin-
ued to uphold the law and order that had just been estab-
lished. That model worked very well in East Timor, and 
it's one that we can expect to see being applicable in some 
situations. But we've learned in peacekeeping never to 
think of one size or one method fits all. There will be dif-
ferent formulae for different situations. I personally 
would hope that we don't undo the lessons of the 
decolonisation period by inviting former colonial powers 
back in very often, but we cannot get away from the fact 
that in some situations it is countries with a historical 
interest in a particular problem, and sometimes a histori-
cal conscience about a particular problem that are most 
likely to be willing to risk the blood and treasure involved 
in a direct intervention. 
A similar case is occurring in the Solomon 
Islands, with an Australian intervention 
approved by the 14 member states of the 
Pacific Forum. How do you feel about this kind 
of regionally approved intervention, rather 
than UN approved? 
The charter of the UN speaks in terms of regional 
arrangements; there has always been the assumption that 
occasionally, in appropriate circumstances, responsibility 
can be delegated to regional organisations or regional 
arrangements. The pros are very clear: these are countries 
that know their own region well, they have a stake in its 
stability, and they act with not only a local knowledge 
but the advantages of proximity which helps in terms of 
deployment logistics and so on. The cons are also well 
known: that this could become, in some cases, an oppor-
tunity for the development of a regional hegemony that 
imposes its will on other countries. When the UN comes 
in it is usually with troops from half a world away, not 
from countries which have an axe to grind, because the 
whole logic is that the UN speaks for the disinterested 
voice of the international communiry as a whole. So we 
have to look at it case by case: there may be some situa-
tions where all concerned, including the recipient coun-
try, want a regional arrangement. You may remember the 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and in Sierra Leone 
before the UN got in, under the auspices of a sub-region-
al arrangement, but with a strong regional power, 
Nigeria, bearing the bulk of the military burden. But 
there are many parts of the world where such regional 
The UN deals with "problems without passports", human rights, refugjee 
movements, terrorism.drug abuse, climate change, poverty, the deafljy 
combination of AIDS, famine and drought in Africa „meeting point: Shashi Tharoor 
French Artemis soldiers 
under EU command and 
with a UN mandate in the 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). The EU 
launched a military 
operation, code-named 
Artemis, in the DRC, 
conducted in accordance 
with a UN Security Council 
Resolution. 
Peter Beck Chnstidnsen/European Commission 
arrangements may not be feasible, either because the 
capacity doesn't exist, or because the political will cannot 
be found in the region, and in those cases, as well as those 
where the challenges are too great for the region, the UN 
will always be called upon to intervene. At its peak 
through the nineties, we had between 14 and 18 UN 
peacekeeping operations around the world, so we've still 
been very much in demand. 
Can you expand on the case of East Timor, 
which has just joined the ACP Group, and the 
UN's role there, which was without precedent? 
East Timor was an extraordinary challenge for us in 
terms of post-conflict peace building because we came in 
when literally, everything had been destroyed. This was 
not only a country where we were starting from zero, but 
in many ways from minus. The reason was the extremely 
unpleasant developments after the referendum that called 
for independence, where militias went on the rampage and 
we believe that not enough was done by the Indonesian 
authorities at the time to stop this rampaging. We were 
fortunate to have an extremely responsible and impressive 
East Timorese national leadership, forged in the crucible 
of exile in some cases and of military resistance in others, 
and in the case of Xanana Gusmão himself, long years in 
prison; an analogy to Nelson Mandela comes to mind. 
The UN took care of everything; unlike Kosovo where we 
divided responsibilities, with NATO doing the security 
and the UN doing the civilian administration, in East 
Timor we were responsible for everything: law and order, 
military security, economic reconstruction, rebuilding, 
and actually running the government. The UN's Special 
Representative, Sergio Viero de Mello ', was de facto, for a 
year and a half, the viceroy of East Timor, which is not a 
term the UN would normally use. For the UN it was an 
extraordinary experience, which culminated in a real 
handover to the East Timorese, after a process in which we 
had been fully involved. We had international officials 
working inside the various ministries, and a UN official 
helped lead the negotiations between East Timor and 
Australia over the oil concessions. That benefited the East 
Timorese because of the clout and expertise a UN official 
could bring to the bargaining table. We have also been 
able to restore to some degree the economic life oí the 
country, even though there is a long way to go yet. 
A lot of countries feel marginalised by the fact 
that decisions are taken by the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. Is the Security 
Council's legitimacy compromised by this 
somewhat anachronistic situation, based on a 
reality of 50 years ago? 
Discussion on this has been going on for a decade. 
Everyone agrees on the diagnosis and no one agrees on the 
prescription. The diagnosis is, as you stated, that indeed the 
UN does reflect the geopolitical realities of 1945. The 
countries which were called the "allies", called themselves 
the United Nations from 1943 onwards, so in fact the UN 
that we know today is the victorious allies of World War II 
converting themselves into a peacetime organisation, and 
naturally the composition of the Security Council reflects 
that. The Charter still refers to "enemy states". But two of 
those so-called enemy states, Germany and Japan, are now 
the third and second largest contributors to the organisa-
tion financially. So there is a certain reek of anachronism. 
But the question goes beyond that, to questions of repre-
sentativeness; in 1945 the Security Council consisted of 
11 members out of a total UN membership of 51. Today it 
is 15 members out of a total UN membership of 191, 
which means it has gone from a body of 22 per cent of the 
members to a body of less than eight per cent, and many 
countries therefore feel they don't have a chance to play a 
part. Some fairly major countries are excluded from per-
manent membership - major in terms of either industrial 
strength and economic output, or in terms of population or 
a combination of the two, or in terms of their contribution 
to UN activities. There's also been a clamour for improving 
the non-permanent membership; Europe, with five per 
cent of the world's population, has 33 per cent of the seats 
on the Security Council. So all of these problems have been 
diagnosed. What we don't have is agreement on the pre-
scription. Do we expand? To what number? How do we 
balance being more representative but not being too large 
to be effective? Do we expand in both categories, perma-
nent and non-permanent? This debate has dragged on for 
so long in a body called The Open Ended Working Group 
of the General Assembly, that it is now universally known 
as the Never Ending Working Group of the General 
Assembly! ■ 
1. Mr Vieira dc Mello was killed in the August 2003 terrorist bombing of the UN 
headquarters in Baghdad 
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Meeting on desertification in Cuba 
The sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (CoP-6) to the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD) took place in Havana, Cuba from 25 August to 5 September 2003. 
More than 2,000 delegates - representing 180 countries, NGOs and international 
organisations - attended. The European Community provided €0.5m through the European 
Development Fund for the participation of ACP delegates. In addition, in the margins of the 
meeting, EU and ACP countries signed a joint statement to enhance cooperation at country 
level to attain UNCCD objectives
1. 
Marc Debois/Marco Morettini* 
The UNCCD was adopted on 17 June 1994 and 
entered into force on 26 December 1996. The Convention 
currently has 190 parties with the recent ratifications by 
the Russian Federation and Lithuania. The European 
Community is also a party to the UNCCD having ratified 
the Convention in 1998. Within the Commission, DG 
Development is "chef de file" for the Convention. This 
means that DG Development staff prepare and coordinate 
Commission input, organise meetings with experts from 
Member States and report on Community activities. 
The main UNCCD objectives are the fight against land 
degradation and mitigation of the effects of drought in 
affected countries through action at all levels (national, sub-
regional and regional), supported by international coopera-
tion and partnership arrangements. Technology transfer 
and effective involvement of local communities and civil 
society are instrumental in achieving these objectives. 
The Convention contains five regional implementa-
tion annexes, for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the northern Mediterranean and Central and 
Eastern Europe. The African annex is the most elaborate, 
both in form and content. It addresses a broad range of 
issues, including commitments and obligations of both 
African and developed-country parties with regard to 
technical assistance and cooperation. 
Enhancing implementation 
UNCCD implementation has been somewhat prob-
lematic in the past. Desertification is a worldwide prob-
lem, but solutions are essentially local or regional, not 
global. The idea of addressing global "public goods" 
through a global convention as in the case of the other 
Rio conventions (particularly biodiversity and climate 
change) did not really function in the UNCCD case. 
This situation and the lack of a dedicated financing mecha-
nism in the Convention meant that the first four CoPs spent 
time on procedures and institutions rather than on substance. 
However, at CoP-5 in October 2001, work in the different 
Convention bodies started to move from the planning phase 
to actual implementation, in particular through the establish-
ment of a new UNCCD subsidiary body, the Committee for 
the Review of the Implementation of the Convention (CRIC). 
The main challenge for CoP-6 was therefore the politi-
cal capacity and willingness of the parties to switch from 
issues of process, institutions and budgets (so far predom-
inant) to concrete action such as support for implementa-
tion on the ground and peer pressure for stronger action. 
What progress? 
Did CoP-6 live up to these expectations? On some impor-
tant issues progress was made. The Conference adopted oper-
ational decisions likely to foster the implementation of the 
Convention and promote its scientific and technological base. 
Among the 31 decisions adopted, key ones relate to the desig-
nation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a finan-
cial mechanism for the Convention and the arrangements to 
facilitate collaboration between GEF and UNCCD; the 
review of the policies and activities of the Global Mechanism 
(the financial brokerage service of the Convention); the indi-
cation of concrete steps needed for improved implementation 
of the Convention and the establishment of synergies with 
other relevant multilateral environment agreements or fora 
such as climate change, biodiversity and forests; the measures 
needed to improve the efficiency of the Committee on Science 
and Technology of the UNCCD. 
However, on some other matters such as the High Level 
Segment of the Conference - held in parallel to the CoP on 
1 to 3 September and attended by 12 Latin American and 
African Heads of State and Government and more than 90 
ministers - the debate fell short of addressing the funda-
mentals of the UNCCD, focusing rather on neo-liberalism 
and globalisation issues. In this respect the Havana 
Declaration, while reaffirming strong political commitment 
to the fight against desertification, does not provide specific 
operational input for an improved implementation of the 
Convention on the ground. Furthermore, tense negotiations 
on budgetary issues put UNCCD accountability, trans-
parency and effectiveness into doubt and did not help to 
restore the Convention credibility ■ 
* DG Development, European Commission, Environment and Rural Development unit 
1. The statement was signed by Ministers Venson and Matteoli (respectively from 
Botswana and Italy) and Koos Richelle on behalf of the European Commission. It 
reflects the content of the Joint Riper on drought and desertification approved by 
the May 2003ACP-EC Council of Ministers. 
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International trade 
Lessons learned in Cancún 
The aim of the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancún, Mexico from 10 to 
15 September 2003 was to take stock of progress achieved halfway through the 
development round launched in Doha in November 2001. Unfortunately, and 
somewhat predictably, it ended in failure. Unless negotiations get back on track 
over the next few months, the breakdown in Cancún could well be the final blow 
to the credibility of a multilateral trade system which is already in crisis. 
Kenneth Karl 
Θ 
Sunday, 14 September: after five days of intense 
discussions, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Luis 
Ernesto Derbez, decided to call time. The WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Cancún was a failure, ending 
as it did without consensus among the organisation's 
146 members on the content of the draft declaration. 
Unhappy at not having obtained precise commitments 
from the United States and Europe on dates and figures 
for ending farming subsidies, the developing countries 
refused to make concessions on the so-called Singapore 
issues of competition policy, investment, trade facilita-
tion and transparency in government procurement. 
The EU's last-minute proposal to drop two of these 
dossiers was not enough to salvage the meeting. 
Despite the many topics on the agenda and the North-
North, South-South differences, this conference will be 
remembered primarily for North-South deadlock, with 
one side seeking desperately to gain a stronger foothold 
in world trade by making its voice heard to a greater 
extent and the other not yet ready to yield on sensitive 
issues. 
Foreseeable failure 
Multilateral world trade negotiations, which have 
been on-going for half a century, have often been pro-
tracted, difficult and complex owing to the many 
interests at play and the growing variety of topics to be 
discussed. The Doha round, in principle devoted to 
development, is no exception. However, the signs of 
an imminent rift between North and South and the 
ensuing failure of the talks were there well before the 
Cancún summit. The ghost of Seattle, which was 
thought to have been finally extinguished by the 
recognised need for a global system of governance, 
particularly following the events of September 11, 
returned to haunt the talks in Cancún. The develop-
ment programme launched at Doha contained quite 
clear undertakings, mainly designed to ensure that the 
specific problems of countries in the South were taken 
into consideration. Agriculture, special and differenti-
ated treatment, access to medicines via the issue of 
intellectual property rights, the framework necessary 
to govern regional agreements, implementation 
issues... at least a minimum amount of progress was 
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expected in all these areas before the Cancún deadline. 
For around two years, the many discussions which 
were meant to ensure progressive implementation of 
the Doha agenda — scheduled for completion by the 
end of 2004 - yielded only limited results. 
Usually the mutual stumbling block for countries in 
the North, agriculture turned out to be an even 
greater bone of contention between North and South. 
Deadlines set well in advance of Cancún for the estab-
lishment of methods concerning commitments made 
in this area had not been adhered to, much to the dis-
satisfaction of many developing countries. In the eyes 
of these countries, for whom agriculture is not only an Cancún 
important sector of development but for many first 
and foremost a question of survival, not enough 
progress was made on the issues of subsidies, market 
access and consideration of their vulnerability with 
regard to market imbalances. The new European CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy) reform for the reduc-
tion of direct subsidies to farmers did not succeed in 
easing tension, which was further exacerbated by the 
cotton initiative. 
that the WTO operates on the basis of "legislative 
lobbying". Non-existent in previous rounds of trade 
negotiations, these smaller countries looked on as the 
heavyweights squared up to one another without risk-
ing entering the ring, for fear of suffering a heavy 
blow. The lay of the land is different now in an insti-
tution where, unlike the IMF and the World Bank, a 
country's weight is not assessed on the basis of its 
financial contribution. 
Delays and broken promises 
Another sticky issue prior to Cancún, positive dis-
crimination within WTO rules, avidly demanded by 
poor countries through an improvement of the special 
and differentiated treatment mechanisms, was left 
unresolved. Developing countries, believing that the 
problems of development can only be incorporated 
into the multilateral system through the use of such 
legal instruments, were once more left to read what 
they would into the delays in this area. Furthermore, 
the issue of access to medicines, which should facili-
tate flexibility in the TRIPS agreements (trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights) — which came 
just a little too late — together with other crucial issues 
for Southern countries all on the Doha agenda, added 
to the complexity of these negotiations. Under such 
circumstances it was too much to hope for a positive 
outcome when most of the WTO members, each with 
a veto, openly displayed their dissatisfaction with a 
system which, they said, should benefit everyone. 
How could the negotiations be constructive if, in a 
round specially dedicated to development, concrete 
measures in this regard had not been taken? During 
preparatory meetings in Geneva, a representative of 
one Least Developed Country voiced his scepticism 
saying, "We have got drawn into a compact of decep-
tion and hypocrisy in which trade unfortunately takes 
precedence over development'. 
According to some analysts, this frustration stems 
from too many broken promises. "Sadly, the reality of 
the international trading system today doesn't match 
the rhetoric," said UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
in a statement read on his behalf in Cancún. 
Developing countries, which in recent years have 
made considerable progress in deregulating their 
economies and opening up borders, find it difficult to 
penetrate the markets of rich countries. Unable to 
subsidise their own farmers, the odds are against them 
vis-à-vis countries which are not all prepared to sub-
stantially reduce their internal aid packages and 
export subsidies worth an estimated one billion dol-
lars per day. Passed right in the middle of post-Doha 
negotiations, the new US Farm Bill was perceived as 
an insult. 
For other observers, countries in the South are grad-
ually beginning to understand the rules of the game. 
They now know that in order to shed the shackles of 
marginalisation and benefit from globalisation 
through an increase in their market shares they also 
have to play by the rules at multilateral level, aware 
A bad deal for the majority 
The Cancún conference was neither the end of one 
round of negotiations nor the launch of another. It 
was an interim meeting intended to take stock of the 
situation halfway through the Doha agenda. 
However, the failure of this conference only a few 
years after Seattle could be bad news for many coun-
tries. For fifty years, trade has been the main driving 
force behind world economic growth, faltering slight-
ly in recent years. A positive result in Cancún could 
have boosted growth worldwide and instilled a little 
more confidence in economic operators. Now, howev-
er, the negative outcome of this conference could 
weaken a world economy which is already slowing 
down. This failure also leaves many experts unsure 
about the true efficacy of the multilateral system and 
fuels the arguments of those seeking a way out of it. 
In Cancún, the countries of the South won a moral 
and political victory but they did not necessarily gain 
credible solutions to their problems. In the absence of 
a fairer multilateral framework which is more capable 
of governing world trade, they could actually see 
themselves marginalised further. 
If this failure of the multilateral system continues, 
countries will tend to opt for regional trade agree-
ments or free trade areas. Without entering into the 
debate regarding whether or not regional trade agree-
ments are just a phase in the globalisation process or 
a response to the shortcomings of multilateralism, the 
disorder that could result is worrying. There is a real 
risk that we will see a plethora of bilateral and region-
al agreements, leading to problems of accommodat-
ing them all at multilateral level. Although permitted 
by the WTO, such agreements do nonetheless require 
rules to implement them and to guarantee that they 
are compatible with the basic principles of free trade. 
Currently, however, WTO rules concerning such 
agreements remain vague and imprecise. How can the 
principal of equal treatment be guaranteed in an 
environment marked by a proliferation of regional 
preferential agreements. Can this multi-faceted world 
trade situation yield greater growth in trade and fair-
ness at world level? There are many questions which 
must rightly be raised regarding the future of the 
world trade system. 
As regards the WTO, although necessary, genuine 
consideration must be given to how it currently oper-
ates in order to make it a genuine instrument of regu-
lation of world trade, despite the growing number of 
its members and issues it has to resolve. ■ 
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A European perspective on the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO 
The immediate general reaction in and around the Cancún Conference Centre to the 
breakdown of negotiations at the WTO's Fifth Ministerial Conference was one of 
surprise and astonishment. This has not entirely faded just weeks later. WTO 
members, aided by countless articles in the media, have had some time to digest 
events, but there is still a lively debate on what particular combination of factors 
played the key role in bringing about the collapse of negotiations and on what 
conclusions should be drawn for the future. Peter Young, who was a member of the 
EC delegation to the Conference in Cancún, gives his view on events there. 
The negotiations broke down over an apparently 
unbridgeable gap in the positions of some members on 
the launch of negotiations on some or all of the so-called 
Singapore issues '. But this was before really intensive 
discussions had taken place on other key issues on the 
table such as agriculture, cotton or market access for 
non-agricultural goods. We shall never know whether 
compromises could have been reached in those areas that 
might have smoothed the way to a mutually acceptable 
outcome on all issues, or whether negotiations would 
still have foundered but in a different area. There was no 
opportunity to put this to the test. 
Was the failure predictable? 
No. I do not believe that any delegation came to 
Cancún except with the intention of working hard to 
reach agreement. Of course, everyone had their own 
offensive and defensive interests to pursue and success 
was in no way guaranteed at the outset. Since negotia-
tions in the WTO can only advance on the basis of con-
sensus, progress depends on all WTO members being 
able to come to a mutually acceptable agreement. 
Cancún served to illustrate the difficulties inherent in 
such an exercise. These difficulties are both substantive 
and procedural. Substantive, in that the 146 (soon to be 
148) individual members of the WTO have their own 
diverse interests that cannot easily be pigeon-holed as 
pro- or anti- any particular issue; procedural in that all 
those same members need to have the opportunity to 
make their interests known and to be engaged in the 
negotiating process. 
Did Cancún reflect a North-South divide? 
Some commentators and NGOs, and maybe even 
some governments, have sought to present Cancún as a 
confrontation between North and South. This is a sim-
plification that presumes that tactical alliances always 
also reflect substantive realities. In none of the issues that 
were the focus of attention in Cancún did WTO mem-
bers split on purely North-South lines. Substantive 
interests differ both among developed and among devel-
oping countries. In agriculture, for example, the interests 
of countries such as Brazil, Argentina or Thailand in 
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obtaining better market access for their own globally-
competitive exports are not automatically the same as 
those of a country that is a net food-importer or of one 
that wants to be able to maintain high border protection 
of its own agricultural sector. A number of developing 
countries, including many within the ACP group, feared 
that their own ability to export would be affected by 
multilateral liberalisation that would erode their own 
existing margins of preference in developed country 
markets. On cotton, where four Western and Central 
African countries had very successfully brought the issue 
into the public eye and onto the negotiating table dur-
ing the run-up to the conference, many developed coun-
tries, including the EC, gave their support, in the con-
text of the broader agriculture negotiations, to initiatives 
to eliminate market access barriers and export subsidies 
and to significantly reduce and possibly eliminate trade-
distorting internal support in the sector. And on each of 
the four Singapore issues, there were many developing 
countries, both before and at Cancún, that spoke in sup-
port of negotiations on one or other topic. Similarly, on 
all these issues, the positions of the developed countries 
were by no means identical. 
In Cancún, developing countries showed that they 
play a key role in the WTO and that they can form effec-
tive alliances to pursue particular points. The G22 group 
took a strong stand on agriculture. Individual members 
of this group, including Brazil, China and India, also 
played an important role in the discussions on many 
other issues on the table aside from agriculture. Other 
groups were very active across the board, including the 
ACP, the Africa Union, the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and a G33 alliance of developing countries 
interested in ensuring wide scope to be able to protect 
their own agricultural sectors from import competition. 
These alliances reflected both well-established regional 
groups, such as the ACP, as well as more ad hoc or temp-
orary alliances, established essentially for the purpose of 
maximising negotiating influence. 
Cancún showed clearly that it is no longer possible -
if ever it really was in a consensus-based organisation 
where each member has the same right to block a con-
sensus — for the major developed countries, EU and US 
in the lead, to impose their own will on the rest of the 
membership. Since all countries have a stake in the mul-
tilateral trading system and participate in the system of 
mutual rights and obligations encapsulated in the WTO, 
it is only right that they should all also have — and feel 
that they have - a voice in its future development. 
Cancún only confirmed what was already evident from 
previous WTO meetings in Geneva: developing coun-
tries have learned how to make sure that their voices are 
heard in the WTO, and how to group together so as to 
ensure their interests are taken into account in negotia-
tions. But Cancún also illustrated that current working 
methods in the WTO do not necessarily facilitate efforts 
to reach mutually acceptable compromises in the limit-
ed time that was available at the ministerial. 
Any successful negotiation requires participants to 
show some readiness to compromise and move away 
from their starting positions. Ifall players insist on noth-
ing less than full satisfaction, then negotiations will 
remain blocked. As far as the EU is concerned, its nego-
tiators showed flexibility — 
both before and at Cancún -
in responding to the sub-
stantive concerns expressed 
by others in various different 
areas of the negotiations, 
including agriculture, non-
agricultural market access, 
cotton and the four 
Singapore issues. Regrettably 
- from our perspective — 
concessions and openings on 
the EU side were not 
Joint press conference by EU 
Commissioners Pascal Lamy (Trade) 
and Franz Fischler (Agriculture and 
Fisheries) at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancun. 
Cancún 
matched by a similar readiness by other participants 
around the table to move away from their own initial 
positions and contribute to compromise. This was prob-
ably a factor in the mind of the chairman of the confer-
ence when he formed the judgement that positions were 
not going to be bridged in Cancún. 
What next? 
There were no winners in Cancún. All WTO mem-
bers lost out, as the foreseen deadline of the end of 2004 
for completion of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) negotiations is now effectively out of reach. That 
implies a delay also in continuing the process of multi-
lateral reform and liberalisation of trade, including in 
agriculture, and in the modernisation of the multilateral 
rulebook in which all WTO members have a stake. 
Given the strong pro-development component of the 
DDA, there could be particular implications for the 
long-term interest of developing countries in achieving a 
greater integration into the global trading system. Delay 
and uncertainty may also only play into the hands of 
countries and interests that prefer protectionism over a 
measured and controlled liberalisation, or unilateralism 
and bilateralism over the multilateral, rules-based 
approach to international trade founded on the WTO. 
Ministers at Cancún failed to agree on a Declaration 
that would have given their negotiators new political 
guidance on the direction to be taken in the next stage 
of the DDA negotiations. As a result, we are perhaps 
now only a third of the way along the likely trajectory of 
the negotiations, rather than at or just beyond halfway. 
Senior officials will now meet in Geneva before the end 
of the year to discuss the way forward, but there must be 
question marks over how easily or quickly they will be 
able to perform the more political role that ministers 
were expected to fulfil at Cancún. 
In light of the outcome of the Ministerial, the EU will 
need some time to consult with its member states and 
with its different internal constituencies, such as the 
European Parliament and the wide range of stakeholders 
within European civil society, including the business 
community and NGOs. The EU has always been one of 
the most active and vocal advocates of the DDA and has 
been instrumental in ensuring its strong pro-develop-
ment character. We have staked a great deal on its suc-
cess. We have consistently argued that the WTO should 
be seen as the international forum for development-
friendly trade opening and parallel rule-making, with 
the DDA as the preferred vehicle for achieving this. At 
Cancún, it became evident that not all other WTO 
members shared this same general political vision to the 
same extent. This only reinforces the need for some time 
to reflect both individually and collectively on how best 
to get the multilateral process back on track and to 
ensure that the WTO is able to work more effectively 
than was possible in Cancún in moving forward so as to 
advance the mutual interests of all its members. ■ 
* Peter Young is First Secretary at the EC Delegation in Geneva. 
1. i.e. Trade facilitation, transparency in government procurement, investment and 
competition. 
n°200 september-october 2003 the Courier ACP-EU f 9 J _Cancún 
ACP Group disappointed 
with the outcome of Cancún 
The ACP Group went to Cancún with great hopes but with apprehensions as wel 
There existed in Cancún a real possibility to restore the promise of the so-called 
Doha Development Agenda, and the Group had prepared well. Great hopes also 
because of the faith the Group has had in the multilateral trading system. 
Morgan Karinge Gitihnji* 
Most Countries had a good grasp of the issues 
involved. They articulated their positions in Geneva, 
Brussels, in the capitals and at regional coordination 
meetings and had therefore anticipated that these posi-
tions would be taken on board at the Ministerial 
Conference. Despite not reaping any credible benefits 
from the system, the Group has continued to support the 
WTO and thus hoped that Cancún would restore the 
imbalance that has seen this group of countries com-
pletely marginalised in international trade. This would 
have been achieved by bringing development issues back 
to the centre stage of the Doha work programme. But the 
ACP Group also had its apprehensions. These arose out 
of the numerous missed deadlines on issues of critical 
importance to it. The ACP Group was also uncomfort-
able with the preparatory process leading to Cancún. The 
draft ministerial text had ignored numerous proposals 
made by members of the Group such that they wondered 
at the criteria used to decide the positions that were 
included in the dtaft texts. 
ACP position 
In preparation for their participation at the 
Ministerial Conference in Cancún, the ACP Ministers 
of Trade met in Brussels on 31 July and 1 August 2003. 
At that meeting, the Ministers adopted a Declaration 
spelling out the overall ACP Group's position on the 
Cancún Conference. They appointed Hon. Jacob 
Nkate, Minister of Trade and Industry of Botswana, 
Chair of the 6th ACP Ministers of Trade meeting, as 
the ACP Group's overall spokesperson for the 
Conference. They planned their participation in 
Cancún, and agreed to meet prior to and in the mar-
gins of the Conference to designate spokespersons for 
Four African countries - Benin, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso - submitted a proposal to the WTO, describing the damage caused to their countries by 
cotton subsidies, and asking for their elimination and financial measures to compensate for the losses to African cotton producers because of the 
subsidies accorded to this sector. Their proposal was discussed in Cancún, and received the attention and support of the joint Groups. WTO Director-
General Supachai Panltchpakdi, urged ministers to consider the proposal seriously, pointing out that the four countries were asking for a solution based 
on a fair multilateral trading system. Cancún 
each of the subject areas to be identified for consulta-
tion during the Conference. Minister Nkate was 
requested to consult with the Chairman of the 
Ministerial Conference before its start and as often as 
necessary, in order to clatify procedures and modalities. 
This would enable the ACP Group to organise itself 
and respond as necessary. It was also deemed necessary 
to agree on a minimum number of representatives to 
attend consultations on each of the subject areas so as 
to ensure effective coverage. 
Ministers decided that the ACP Ministerial 
Declaration would be circulated to all participants as an 
official working document of the Conference. They 
mandated the ACP Group in Geneva to prepare a vade-
mecum containing the detailed ACP position on all 
issues on the agenda of the Conference. In preparing this 
document, the Geneva group was requested to take 
account of the positions of the African Union and Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). The Declaration and the 
vade-mecum served as a reference for the overall 
spokesperson and spokespersons on the various subject 
areas. The Ministers agreed to build alliances and to hold 
joint meetings with the African Union and the LDCs 
during the Ministerial. It was also agreed that joint posi-
tions and alliances could be developed with other group-
ings should the need arise. Finally, they agreed to devel-
op and use, before and during the Cancún meeting, a 
media strategy focused on, inter alia, issuing press releas-
es and convening press briefings and conferences as well 
as interviews, as often as necessary. 
Joint positions 
In view of the overlap of membership and common-
ality of interests, the ACP Group, the African Union 
and the LDCs met and agreed that the three groups 
should present joint positions and consult regularly. 
They appointed joint coordinators who presented the 
joint position of the three groups on issues under dis-
cussion, namely agriculture, non-agricultural market 
access, development issues and Singapore issues. Other 
issues of interest to the group were special and differ-
ential treatment, implementation issues, commodities, 
rules on regional trade agreements especially in view of 
the on-going ACP-EU negotiations on economic part-
nership agreements (EPAs), LDC issues, small 
economies, debt and finance, trade and ttansfet of 
technology and technical assistance and capacity build-
ing, accession observer status and coherence in global 
economic governance. The issue of cotton subsidies 
also received the attention and support of the joint 
groups. 
Following the conclusion of the work of the working 
groups and the preparation of a revised Ministerial 
text, the three groups met jointly to consider the 
revised text. They were disappointed that most, if not 
all, of the issues of interest to them had not been taken 
on board. The ACP spokesperson, speaking on behalf 
of the three groups, conveyed to the meeting of heads 
of delegation the disappointment of the groups. The 
majority of developing countries expressed similar sen-
timents. The Chairman of the Conference therefore 
decided to hold further consultations with a view to 
narrowing the areas of divergence. With regard to the 
Singapore issues, which were the first to be considered 
under Chairman's consultations, it became apparent 
that two extreme positions existed. On the one hand, 
the ACP Group, the African Union and the LDCs 
supported by a sizeable group of other developing 
countries, could not agree to the commencement of 
negotiations in this area. On the other hand, South 
Korea and Japan indicated that they would not sup-
port the consensus if negotiations would not begin on 
all the four Singapore issues. It should be noted that 
with the exception of trade facilitation, the EC was 
prepared to drop its demand for negotiations on other 
Singapore issues. 
Following this stalemate, the Chairman of the 
Conference decided that it would not be possible to 
reach consensus on the draft Ministerial text. 
Importance of solidarity 
In retrospect, the meeting of ACP Ministers ol Trade 
held in Brussels created a solid foundation for the par-
ticipation of the Group at the Cancún Ministerial. In 
terms of preparation and organisation, the Group was 
able to articulate its position in a single voice and in a 
coordinated manner. 
The alliance of the ACP Group, the African Union 
and the LDCs became a formidable force in the negoti-
ations. This underscores the importance of unity and 
solidarity as well as the strength in numbers in the nego-
tiations. This should be a lesson for the ACP Group for 
its EPA negotiations with the EU. Although the second 
phase of the EPA negotiations is due to commence with 
discussions moving from Brussels to the regions, it is 
imperative that the ACP group should remain united in 
purpose to articulate and defend its legitimate interests 
during the entire process of the negotiations. 
In the meantime, the Secretary-General of the ACP 
Group, Jean-Robert Goulongana, and the WTO 
Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding in Cancún for closer 
cooperation between the two organisations in providing 
training and technical assistance for ACP countries. 
The Memorandum of Understanding commits both 
organisations to cooperate more closely to provide train-
ing, technical assistance and support to negotiators of 
the ACP member states in their efforts to become more 
active members of the WTO by developing their capac-
ity to negotiate more effectively and to monitor and 
implement WTO agreements, especially in view of the 
heavy work-load arising from the Doha Work 
Programme. 
The ACP Group intends to continue to play its right-
ful role and participate effectively in multilateral trade-
negotiations. ■ 
' Expert, Multilateral Trade Issues.ACP Secretariat. 
[The views expressed ¡ti this article do not necessarily reflect those ol' the 
(ironp or of the ACP Secretariat! 
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Trade negotiations after Cancún: 
All parties must now re-evaluate their positions 
The WTO negotiations in Geneva failed to produce a draft ministerial text which commanded 
consensus, a situation similar to that which preceded the ministerial meetings in Seattle and Doha. 
The fundamental differences in Geneva were substantial and deeply entrenched, such that a series 
of mini-ministerial meetings was not able to resolve them prior to the Cancún meeting. In addition, 
the hastily conceived US-EU proposal on tariff reduction formulas, particularly in agriculture, did not 
assuage the concerns of the developing countries. As a result, the expectations of the Cancún 
Ministerial were extremely ambitious in that instead of taking decisions on a few substantive issues, 
an agreement in Cancún would have required ministers to delve into fairly complex technical issues. 
Richard L. Bernal* 
The principal issue to be resolved in Cancún was the 
modalities for tariff liberalisation in agriculture and non-
agricultural market access. Other important issues included 
TRIPS and public health, special and differential treatment 
for developing countries, the Singapore issues (investment, 
competition policy, government procurement and trade facil-
itation) and the treatment of cotton from the least developed 
countries. Developed countries believed that there was a need 
for greater efforts in trade liberalisation by the developing 
countries. In turn developing countries were disappointed by 
the attitude of the developed countries towards meaningful 
advancement on development issues. They felt that the 
wealthier and more developed countries could and should 
make more substantial concessions. The gap between these 
opposing perceptions was never narrowed and played a signif-
icant part in derailing the talks. 
The deadlock on the Singapore issues allowed the devel-
oped countries to blame the developing countries for the 
break-up of the meeting, ignoring the fact that the most con-
tentious issue was the relatively meager offers by the developed 
countries on agriculture, and in particular the inadequacy of 
the proposals to reduce trade distorting subsidies and domes-
tic support. All indications were that it was most unlikely that 
the entrenched position on agriculture could be resolved to 
attain a consensus in Cancún. Had the meeting foundered on 
agriculture, it would have revealed that developed countries 
had made an unacceptable proposal, which did not adequate-
ly address the concerns of developing countries. The devel-
oped countries cannot escape some blame for the collapse 
because of their disappointing stance on agriculture. 
Collapse of the Cancún meeting 
As is normal at WTO Ministerial meetings there are a series 
of formal plenaries and meetings, the "green room" (where 
participation is generally reserved for countries whose input 
and positions are considered to be key), and a phalanx of 
informal and subsidiary meetings. It is not clear why 
Chairman Derbez allowed the "green room" meeting to start 
with a discussion of the Singapore issues which were the sub-
ject of diametrically opposed positions on whether there was 
"an explicit mandate" to begin negotiations. Developing 
countries reiterated their position that there was no mandate 
and furthermore they would not countenance the inclusion of 
these issues in a post-Cancún WTO process. 
It was surprising that no attempt was made in the "green 
room" to discuss agriculture, non-agricultural market access, 
TRIPS or other critically important topics. Perhaps starting 
the agenda with agriculture or deferring the resolution of the 
Singapore issues could have allowed progress to be made or 
agreement to be reached on some items, providing momen-
tum to the deliberations. 
Developing country solidarity 
The developing countries as a group remained united on 
issues such as special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, the Singapore issues, reduction of agricultural sub-
sidies in the developed countries and cotton in the least devel-
oped countries. The developing country solidarity is a heart-
ening sign of a new resolve, the emergence of a new dynam-
ic in the WTO negotiation process and augers well for the 
future. It took the developed countries by surprise, occurring 
at a time when the "quad" countries of the US, EU, Canada 
and Japan were disunited and could not mount the tradi-
tional monolithic disposition towards developing countries. 
Developing countries were united with respect to the 
paucity of meaningful proposals on issues of concern to 
them, and commonality of interests in broad thematic issues. 
Importantly, the developing country strategic alliance 
remained firm despite the existence of sub-groups united 
around special interest issues e.g., the least developed coun-
try issues and small economy issues. Traditional coalitions, 
such as the ACP Group, arrived in Cancún with previously 
agreed positions as expressed in the ACP Ministerial 
Declaration, and maintained solidarity throughout the 
meeting. Nascent coalitions blossomed and new alliances 
emerged, most notably the G22, and the Alliance for Special 
Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms. 
WTO: pause, rewind or fast-forward 
Some have opined that the Cancún meeting was a once-
in-a-generation opportunity to advance the multilateral 
trade agenda. This gross exaggeration was calculated to 
mobilise support for a decision on the terms of the devel-
oped countries and to deter dissent. Those not predisposed 
to agree to any terms would be portrayed as spoilers. 
Predictions that the collapse of the Cancún meeting would 
lead to the demise of the WTO are overblown, as the out-
come will not impair its essential functions, which are 
© 
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negotiating new rules, implementing existing ones and adju-
dicating disputes in the application of rules. All three func-
tions will continue as: (1) The Ministerial mandate to nego-
tiate the Doha Development Round is still in place and has 
a schedule of completion of January 2005, (2) The process 
of implementing existing rules will continue unabated, and 
(3) disputes will undoubtedly continue to arise. 
Multilateral versus bi-lateral 
Even before leaving Cancún, US Trade Representative 
Robert Zoellick began to berate those countries which 
refused to accede to the commencement of negotiations on 
the Singapore issues, disparaging them as "won't do's" and 
accusing them of being involved in political posturing and 
rhetoric. In a thinly veiled threat, he stated that the US 
would pursue bi-lateral initiatives with those countries 
deemed to be serious about trade liberalisation. However, 
this bi-lateral process has been going on since the FTA with 
Canada transformed into NAFTA, and other initiatives 
which were moving apace before Cancún, with the recent 
conclusion and Congressional approval of free trade agree-
ments with Chile and Singapore. Additionally, negotiations 
with Central America started months before anyone could 
have predicted deadlock in Cancun. Similarly, a commit-
ment was given to the Dominican Republic to commence 
negotiations in early 2004. 
Recrimination and the "blame game" 
Zoellick warned that the losers were the developing coun-
tries, who in his view threw away the opportunity to make 
gains in the multilateral trade system. Such a perspective is 
predicated on predictions of how much a deal in Cancún 
could boost world trade and thereby lift exports and growth 
in the developing countries. The World Bank estimated that 
a new round of trade liberalisation would taise global output 
by $290 billion to $520 billion, supposedly lifting 144 mil-
lion people out of poverty by 2015. Other estimates are less 
optimistic; for example, it has been calculated that ending 
agricultural protectionism would boost growth in the global 
economy by $100 billion dollars, but only $8 billion would 
accrue to poor countries. These figures cast doubt on the 
notion being propagated that developing countries were the 
big losers, when the reality is that in todays world economy 
the major beneficiaries and therefore main losers would in 
Cancún 
From left to right, 
Martin Redrado, 
secretary of Trade and 
Foreigh Economic 
relations, Argentina; 
Ivonne Juez de Baki, 
Ecuador's Minister of 
Foreign Trade; Youssef 
Boutros-Ghali, Egypt's 
Minister of Foreign 
Trade; Celso Luiz Nunes 
Amorim, Brazil's 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and Alexander 
Erwin, South Africa's 
Minister of Trade and 
Industry, join hands 
after their joint meeting 
during the Cancún 
Ministerial. 
fact be the developed countries. Approximately 25 per cent 
of growth in the US economy emanates from exports and 
the figure is higher for most other developed economies. 
The viewpoint that the failure of the talks is attributable to 
the stubbornness of the developing countries diverts atten-
tion from the unacceptable proposals of the developed coun-
tries on agriculture, and rheir disregard for developing coun-
try interests in special and differential treatment, implemen-
tation and development issues in general. The last minute 
US acquiescence to the agreement on TRIPS and public 
health seemed reluctant and less than genuine. 
Furthermore, the lateness of the EU-US compromise pro-
posal on agriculture did not allow time to mobilise support 
or revise the proposal. 
Prospects for progress 
All parties must accept some responsibility for the lack of a 
result and should therefore refrain from attempting to place 
blame on others. While the original deadline for completion 
of the Doha Development Agenda seems in jeopardy, it is far 
more important to achieve a balanced development round 
promoting agreement than to adhere to any particular sched-
ule. The prospects for progress in the WTO negotiations will 
centre on the negotiations in agriculture. The reform of the 
elaborate system of subsidies and domestic support in agri-
culture in the US, Japan and the EU is an extremely difficult 
task and commitments to reducing or eliminating these trade 
distorting measures through the WTO would not be wel-
comed in an election year in the US nor in European capitals 
determined to reform the CAP over the longest possible time 
period. After a period of sober reflection member states must 
resume the negotiations in Geneva as soon as feasible. They 
must review their positions technically and politically and 
recommit to full engagement in the WTO negotiations 
without being substantially diverted by simultaneous involve-
ment in bi-lateral and regional initiatives. This is not a time 
for despondency or compiacene)': the pause, which inevitably 
follows Cancún, is an opportunity for a through re-examina-
tion encompassing all the disciplines and issues. It is a time to 
realise in a globalised world that national economic well-being 
can best be attained and sustained in a multilateral trade sys-
tem in which there is opportunity and development for all. ■ 
• Director General of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinen.- (RNM), 
created by CARICOM governments to develop and execute an overall negotiating 
strategy for trade-related negotiations in which the region is involved. 
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EU, Cotonou and EPAs: 
the view from the Pacific Islands 
Perceptions between partners, no less than regions, are important in that they 
usually either reflect real positive intentions or an indifferent attitude: the former 
would signal a continuation of present policy direction; the latter a need to 
improve and generate a more positive interaction with one another. It is safe to 
say that the relationship between the European Union and the Pacific Islands, as 
reflected in current attitudes, is found between these poles and if anything is 
being characterised more and more by a desire for constructive interaction. 
Dr Malakai Koloamatangi* 
This ¡S true from the point of view of the islands, 
which, in the eyes of the EU, are the 14 members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum — a regional grouping that came to 
life in 1971. It is made up of the Pacific's independent 
nation states, but also includes New Zealand and 
Australia. Its mandate is to foster cooperation at inter-
governmental level in political and economic matters in 
ways that will benefit the islands at regional and inter-
national level, though it lives by a liberal interpretation 
of this. 
It is probably more difficult for the Pacific states to 
see the EU in such a neat fashion. Interestingly, the 
tidy configuration that is the Pacific Islands Forum 
representing "the Pacific" in the EU's estimation is not 
as integrated as the EU. Whereas the integrated EU is 
not generally seen by Pacific nations as being a simple, 
unitary artifice but rather as a complicated and evolv-
ing entity. At other times EU member states are 
regarded as individual countries loosely joined for the 
pursuance of greater economic and political benefits, 
much in the mould of Pacific regional organisations, 
including the Pacific Islands Forum. Hence, the great 
enthusiasm shown by the EU with regard to the 
"blending" nature of the Pacific Islands Countries 
Trade Agreement and the Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations. 
Familiarity with Europe 
As relations and attitudes generally reinforce each 
other, the Pacific, despite the vast distances in spatial, 
cultural and other terms, has had a long time — since the 
1500s — to familiarise itself with Europe and Europeans. 
This was particularly evident during the colonial period 
when individual European countries, including Great 
Britain, Germany and France, administered colonies in 
the region and thus Pacific societies were able to experi-
ence first-hand European ways. Intimacy with 
European ideas and practices, similar to the current 
relationship, vacillated between seeing Europe as the 
way to the good life — to the point that people dressed, 
spoke, thought, and lived in a not totally convincing 
attempt to look like Europeans - and a total rejection of 
Europe, which was paralleled by a growing demand for 
self-determination. 
But perceptions from the Pacific are as much coloured 
by local conditions as they are by the EU's policy instru-
ments. In other words, the 14 Pacific states as part of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group have an 
effect on relations. And so did the Lomé Convention pre-
viously, and now the Cotonou Agreement. Development 
policies, nevertheless, are justifiably triggered by local 
conditions. Although ties through Lomé enhanced such 
elements as the idea of partnership and a more holistic 
approach to development which was encouraged by com-
bining aid, trade and politics, clearly the tangible socio-
economic results were inadequate. This was reflected in 
the ACP countries' share of the EU market which 
declined from 6.7 per cent in 1976 to three per cent in 
1998, while about 60 per cent of total exports were con-
centrated in only 10 products. ' 
Cotonou was the answer. Underpinned by the politi-
cal dimension, need for participation, focus on poverty 
reduction, new framework for economic and trade 
cooperation and a reform of financial cooperation, it 
aimed, as Article 1 states "... to promote and expedite 
the economic, cultural and social development of the 
ACP states, with a view to contributing to peace and 
security and to promoting a stable and democratic polit-
ical environment". 
Overarching approach 
In practical terms, it signals, according to Poul 
Nielson, Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid, a move away from limited targeted 
assistance to comprehensive sector programmes where, if 
the problem is access to education, you not only build 
schools but also look at teachers' salaries, job satisfaction, 
child labour and how education is seen by local commu-
nities. 
The significance of the Cotonou Agreement to the 
Pacific was pethaps summed up best by the Secretary 
General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Noel 
Levi, during his opening remarks at the Forum Officials 
Committee Pre-Forum Session of the 34th Pacific Islands 
Forum meeting in Auckland, August 2003, where he 
highlighted the comprehensive nature of the agreement: 
Good governance must be taken seriously for it is no 
longer just a "catch phrase". It is real and enshrined in 
0 
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George Gwyer, DG Development. European Commission 
soft laws, such as the Aitutaki Declaration, and in the 
hard laws, including the Cotonou Agreement. As a pre-
requisite to donors assisting our members' efforts to 
achieve sustainable development, it is also very necessary. 
We sometimes tend to forget that good governance was 
practiced by our ancestors; the terms may be different, 
but the very fundamentals are what we value even today". 
Acceptance of such an overarching approach will 
depend not only on individual countries' perception of 
the Cotonou Agreement and the perceived benefits, but 
also on their political role in their respective locales. For 
instance, civil society organisations, which feature promi-
nently in the new agreement's scheme of things, are elat-
ed at being finally acknowledged for their role in devel-
opment. However, requiring governments to be inclusive 
towards these organisations without an existing tradition 
for doing so, or where the political culture excludes even 
contemplating such an idea, will prove challenging. 
These possible difficulties, however, may be balanced, 
as already mentioned, by the consequential advantages. 
They also help to elevate the EU's position generally, in 
Pacific island thinking. Accounting for around €100 
million annually, the EU is one of the largest donors of 
aid to the region. In addition, the Cook Islands, one of 
six new ACPs, has already benefited under Cotonou. It 
has received €2 million as part of the larger pool of funds 
that it will receive over the next 20 years, to implement 
education and health programmes in the outer, more 
isolated, islands. As well, during the recent Pacific Islands 
Koos Richelle, Director General of the 
European Commission's development 
directorate-general (2nd from right), 
speaking with Lady Kidu, Papua New 
Guinea's Social Welfare and Development 
Minister and her constituents in Pari, just 
outside the capital, Port Moresby. 
Forum meeting, Nauru and Niue 
had their "Country strategy 
papers" signed (allocating €2.3 
million and €2.6 million respec-
tively) and a €3.965 million 
Financing Agreement was signed 
for Tuvalu. Coupled with the 
conviction among Pacific ACPs 
that not only is the EU capable 
of funding the Cotonou 
Agreement but that it will do so, 
a desire for amicable relations 
will be further cultivated. 
EPAs 
The success or otherwise of 
the new agreement will hinge to 
a great extent on the effec-
tiveness of the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
— one of Cotonou's develop-
ment vehicles. However, it 
seems that the fundamental cri-
teria of the EPAs are sufficiently flexible, to the extent 
that the process can, if need be, become an end in itself, 
somewhat shortening the distance between success and 
failure. They are also understood as such by both parties. 
To further ensure success, the EU is willing, at the con-
clusion of the current all-ACP negotiations, to allow a 
little leeway to Pacific ACPs in order to familiarise them-
selves with the upcoming negotiations, including a peri-
od of consultation and further dialogue with the EU's 
assistance and participation. 
Although there is a sense of optimism among the 
14 Pacific states that the new partnership agreement may 
finally deliver what so many well-intentioned strategies 
have failed to do in the past, there are still challenges to 
be met. From the perspective of thinking and ideating 
one another, it is important that entities, ideas and prac-
tices are seen for what they are in reality. For instance, 
the EU needs to understand the breadth and depth of 
the Pacific as a region and individually, and the common 
and unique conditions contained within such charact-
erisations. For the Pacific, it must be sincere in its efforts 
to assist the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs in suc-
ceeding. This should be helped by the fact that the EU 
has a generally positive standing in the region, without 
any colonial baggage to hold it back. Rather, there is, 
generally, only a progressive orientation. ■ 
* National Centre for Research on Europe·, Department of Political Science, 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch. New Zealand 
1. http://europa.eu.inl/eomiii/develo|imen[/l><Klv/eotonouA)verview en,htm 
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Microprojects in Suriname -
a contribution to community needs 
In many ACP states, microprojects are perhaps one of the most visible activities 
of the European Development Fund. Experience shows that these "demand 
driven" projects can be particularly successful where the socio-cultural 
pre-conditions for the microproject concept - in particular community 
ownership and participation - exist. 
Bas van Helden* 
The basic principle of microprojects is that they 
meet priority community needs, are undertaken at the 
initiative of the beneficiaries and are implemented with 
their active participation. The European Development 
Fund contributes up to three-quarters of the total value 
of each individual project and the local community a 
minimum of one quarter, in cash and/or kind. 
Individual microprojects are small in value, sometimes 
only a few thousand euro but often make a huge differ-
ence to the community involved because they respond to 
a commonly felt priority need. 
This is also the case in Suriname, where the second 
microprojects programme (€5 million) started in 
November 2001. The programme will be implemented 
over a period of five years. The overall objective is to 
reduce poverty, social inequality and dependence on 
state intervention. Since the start of the programme it 
has become clear that important spin-off effects are the 
strengthening of civil society in Suriname (the major 
partner in implementation) and an enhanced dialogue 
between government and civil society. NGOs play a key 
role in the implementation of the microprojects and 
cooperating with the local communities. In addition, 
there is an increased role for the private sector; in sever-
al projects the communities call upon financial support 
from private sector companies in Suriname to co-finance 
projects. 
The project concept ensures a fair geographical spread 
of projects and interventions, in capacity building, social 
infrastructure and income-generating activities, all at 
community level. 
The implementation process is now accelerating and a 
total of 15 projects have been completed. A further 
32 are in various stages of implementation. In addition, 
140 project proposals are being processed for implemen-
tation. There is a major emphasis on social infrastructure 
and indeed the positive effects on the communities are 
clear: one project involves providing basic sporting facil-
ities for a secondary school in one of the outer districts 
— according to the school principal the only alternative 
to drink and drugs; another, the rehabilitation of a home 
for destitutes and abused women. Furthermore, many 
schools will be rehabilitated and given adequate facili-
ties, small children's day-care centres for low-income 
women workers created, technical and administrative 
training for producer groups provided and many others. 
In nearly all cases it was clear: there was no alternative 
source for help, and without the microprojects pro-
gramme these projects would simply not have materi-
alised at all. 
Now that local communities are equipped with better 
facilities, the next issue is maintenance. Local communi-
ties, with the help of NGOs, will establish maintenance 
groups to take on this responsibility. ■ 
* DG Development, European Commission, Caribbean unit. 
Above: A women's group from Suriname's interior is taught basic 
business skills in order to create income from embroidery work. 
Guidance is provided by the National Women's Movement. 
Total project cost: €19.000 (of which €13.000 from the EDF). 
Below: A small children's day care centre in a social housing scheme in the 
capital Paramaribo, which makes it possible for less privileged women to 
have a job. Total cost: €25.000 (of which €14.000 from the EDF). 
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Political dialogue 
and Cotonou 
One of the notable changes introduced by the ACP-EC 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement is the strengthening of 
the political dimension through enhanced dialogue. 
A broader and more coherent framework, which includes 
political aspects, has replaced a model of cooperation 
which for a long time focused on economic objectives. 
Today, one of the essential characteristics of this 
multilateral partnership is that it combines development 
aid (essential for the ACP countries), trade (to respond to 
the challenges of globalisation) and a strengthened 
political dimension which enables the partnership to take 
into account political aspects which also have an impact 
on development. Making political dialogue a major pillar 
in the ACP-EU partnership is a demonstration that the 
relationship has come a long way in terms of putting 
political issues in the forefront. 
The Cotonou Agreement not only reaffirms the political 
aspects of the partnership, but clarifies and significantly 
strengthens the accompanying political dialogue which 
already existed between the parties. Article 8 of the 
Agreement lays down the principal criteria to be used as a 
basis for a balanced and efficient dialogue, Other 
provisions on political dialogue are found in Articles 96, 
97, and 98. In May 2003, guidelines for conducting this 
dialogue were approved by the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers. The political dialogue under the Cotonou 
Agreement is still at a learning stage and time will be 
needed to assess its relevance and to fine tune its modus 
operandi. 
In the first article in this dossier, Lyssandros Stathopoulos 
from the European Commission gives a general overview, 
saying that political dialogue under Article 8 is regular and 
continuous, ensuring exchange of information and mutual 
understanding. Karin Arts says that while the Agreement 
contains an advanced set of provisions on human rights, 
democracy and good governance, certain obstacles 
impede effective implementation. Andrew Bradley from 
the ACP Secretariat describes measures being taken to 
operationalise political dialogue, and looks at its 
application within the ACP and even beyond the ACP-EU 
relationship. The following two articles give a European 
(Gérard Karlshausen from CNCD) and an ACP (Nancy 
Kachingwe from MWENGO) civil society perspective. 
Hanja Maij-Weggen describes the role the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly can play, especially through its 
newly created Standing Committee on Political Affairs. 
Finally, James Mackie looks at implementation during the 
three years since the signing of the Agreement, citing 
specific cases, and proposing possible approaches. 
Kenneth Karl 
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EU-ACP relations are governed by 
the Cotonou Agreement, an 
integrated framework based on 
partnership and promoting 
cooperation, trade and political 
dialogue. Article 8 of the 
Agreement makes political 
dialogue an integral part of the 
partnership established by that 
Agreement. The reinforced 
relationship between the 
Community and the ACP has 
evolved into a "partnership". 
As part of this relationship 
Article 8 calls for political 
dialogue to play a key role in 
tackling issues and difficulties at 
an early stage, setting flexible 
parameters while permitting 
certain sensitive issues between 
sovereign states to be included. 
The dialogue specified in Article 8 
has the potential to promote 
significant improvement in the 
Community's relationship with 
the ACP countries. Furthermore, 
the emphasis on political and 
governance obligations, grouped 
under "essential elements" 
(human rights, democratic 
principles, the rule of law), 
necessitates better 
communication and dialogue, a 
deeper relationship. 
Lyssandros Stathopoulos* 
Political dialogue reflects the normal state of relations 
between the partners. It has an ubiquitous and omnipresent 
chatacter and is applied permanently. It is regular and contin-
uous, not a one-off event, ensuring exchange of information 
and mutual understanding, and establishing common priori-
ties. Thus, it is applied in all ACP states with which the 
Community cooperates, irrespective of other processes, 
notably those related to Article 96 (consultations on respect of 
essential elements). There is, therefore, no need to formally 
start a dialogue, although it may be useful to reinforce it or to 
structure it to ensure that it addresses key issues. 
Holistic approach 
Article 8 is inclusive, covering a wide range of issues - not just 
the "essential elements" but also peace and security, global, 
tegional and sectoral development cooperation policies, envi-
ronment, gender, migration, cultural heritage, as well as specif-
ic issues, like arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs, 
organised crime, ethnic, religious and racial discrimination. 
This reflects the recognition that striving for peace and securi-
ty and fighting against poverty necessitate tackling issues 
beyond the traditional sphere of "high" politics (fot instance, 
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"Political dialogue under ] 
Article 8 ï 
reflects the normal state of 
affairs in relations between the 
Community and the ACP states 
Political dialogue 
and Cotonou 
environment) i.e. beyond managing and projecting power 
between self-ruling states. It requires cooperation in areas direct-
ly affecting the human condition beyond boundaries and beyond 
governments. Article 8 provides a framework encompassing areas 
for action which can help attain the overall objective of poverty 
eradication. This holistic and "interdisciplinary" approach and 
the ensuing possibilities of mixing appropriate policies requires a 
high degree of coherence, complementarity and coordination. 
The parties to the dialogue can agree jointly on specific issues 
which are urgent and/or of importance to a country. 
Article 8 calls for flexible parameters, so political dialogue can 
be conducted through existing instruments rather than by creat-
ing new structures This flexibility is its greatest asset. It concerns 
the choice of items for discussion without a need for specific 
terms of reference or a strict time frame. No formal start and/or 
formal end need to be envisaged, and questions such as the 
venue, the composition of the parties, the frequency, the level of 
formality, the institutional framework reflect the wishes of the 
parties and can be changed in the course of the dialogue. In prac-
tice, understanding ofthat flexibility is not so evident. Insistence 
by either party, i.e. EU or ACP government, on a "formal" open-
ing of political dialogue, on drafting of formal terms of 
reference, on modali-
ties of conduct, on an 
exclusive list of items 
of discussion and 
details, on dialogue by 
appointment only, 
even reluctance to 
"enter" into political 
dialogue are all exam-
ples of a perception 
that political dialogue 
is something excep-
tional, a one-off occa-
sion that needs to be 
conducted in a pre-
arranged manner, or 
even an intrusion into 
the normality of polit-
ical life that needs to 
be neutralised as far as 
possible. 
The guidelines on 
political dialogue 
adopted by the ACP-
EC Council of 
Ministers in May 
2003 are intended to 
help the "practition-
ers" understand it as a 
process with flexible 
parameters and make 
full use of the possi-
bilities it entails. 
Flexibility should not be conceived as lack of credibility or 
resolve to taclde real issues and potential difficulties. A certain 
level of regularity with realistic timetables would inspire confi-
dence as well as commitment of the parties to the dialogue and 
ownership of the whole process. Dialogue in itself is positive but 
to be really useful it must address root causes of problems and 
cannot avoid fundamental issues such as respect for human 
rights and good governance. The programming process of the 
9th EDE for example, entailed elements of political dialogue — 
including exchange of views on the state of affairs in a country, 
the identification of problems, the suggestion of solutions, the 
wider implications of development cooperation, the association 
of non-state actors. 
Associating civil society 
The full association of non-state actors is a significant inno-
vation of Cotonou. Associating civil society with political dia-
logue presents a particular challenge to established practice. 
Non-state actors have been brought into the programming of 
aid, but their association with dialogue on political issues is 
sensitive and for governments in difficult circumstances may 
appear problematic. Political dialogue involving civil society as 
a rightful party will be a learning process, requiring experi-
mentation. The vatying degrees of organisation, the underly-
ing national political conditions and local traditional dialogue 
mechanisms mean that a country-specific approach is 
required. The ease of involving civil society in the process of 
political dialogue may reflect the degree of democratic matu-
rity of the government institutions in any specific country. To 
date, civil society has not been systematically involved in the 
political dialogue process at country level. Certain sensitive 
issues require careful consideration in terms of liaising with a 
particular civil society interlocutor, and national authorities 
may occasionally be reticent to give publicity to such dialogue. 
In order to hold a substantial, inclusive dialogue at country 
level aimed at reducing the risk of problems turning into 
crises, a greater effort to implicate civil society needs to be 
made. Like all parties involved in political dialogue, civil soci-
ety should also be able to demonstrate legitimacy and 
accountability in terms of constituency, and participate 
according to their expertise on the subject and capacity to con-
duct the dialogue in a sustained manner. These requirements 
cannot be used indiscriminately as a "legitimate" obstacle to 
exclude civil society - pluralistic dialogue is enriching and 
reinforces the efforts of all those governments with a genuine 
will to promote the well-being of their people. 
Dialogue can underpin regional integration 
Regional and subregional organisations can also be associ-
ated with the political dialogue. No new structures need be 
created - dialogue with these organisations is already taking 
place on the spot, or forms part of an institutional obliga-
tion. The dialogue which began with the Southern Africa 
countries in Berlin in 1999, in the aftermath of apartheid in 
South Africa and the emergence of SADC, in retrospect 
could be considered as an example of Article 8 in operation. 
The objective of regional integration and cooperation can be 
served by involving regional organisations in the political 
dialogue. Regional integration can be built on a number of 
conditions, including respect for peace and security and for 
the essential elements (human rights, rule of law, democrat-
ic principles, good governance). Indeed, once these basic 
preconditions are fulfilled, regional integration tends to con-
solidate and lock-in the achievements. Thus, political dia-
logue with regional organisations can effectively underpin 
the regional integration process, a major strategy of the 
Cotonou Agreement, especially in light of the future trade 
regime between the Community and the ACP states. The 
topics of dialogue with the regional organisations generally 
reflect their relative strengths and specialisations and 
respond to their evolving mandate and capacities. Political 
dialogue, therefore, should be pragmatic and undertaken 
where a value added is expected in strengthening regional 
integration processes. Regional organisations tend to devel-
op an increasing political role (for instance, the role of 
ECOWAS in crises in West Africa) which makes dialogue 
with them all the more relevant and necessary. 
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Joint institutions 
The ACP-EC Council of Ministers, Committee of 
Ambassadors, Joint Parliamentary Assembly and other insti-
tutions also provide an occasion for political dialogue in a 
larger and therefore more comprehensive framework. Topics 
of mutual interest at that level can be general (regional inte-
gration, conflict prevention, attainment of global develop-
ment goals etc) and/or particular, with wider political rami-
fications (for instance, a country situation with destabilising 
spillover effects in the region). Political dialogue at the joint 
institutions provides a useful opportunity for stocktaking, 
where the overall quality of the Community's political dia-
logue with the ACP can be assessed. 
An inherent potential weakness — but also a real strength 
— of political dialogue is the multiplicity of the actors 
involved. This multiplicity reflects a process which is expect-
ed to be conducted in a spirit of openess and mutual respect 
which can therefore be considered democratic and legitimis-
ing. At the same time, pluralism requires that the positions 
expressed are coordinated and coherent. The sui generis 
structure of the EU, involving the Commission (headquar-
ter services and delegations), the Presidency, and the 
Member States, in political dialogue makes coordination 
and coherence of positions a sine qua non for the credibili-
ty of the dialogue process and of the EU itself. To "speak 
with one voice" remains a difficult challenge for the Union 
in its relations with the ACP states; coordination and coher-
ence in this area have been improved but further progress is 
needed. 
Syiia Intornationa^Souleymanc Ouattara 
Non-respect of essential elements 
All cooperation agreements signed by the European 
Community contain clauses on respect for essential elements, 
which allow for suspension, in full or in part, in the case of non-
respect. In the Cotonou Agreement there is a consultation pro-
cedure set out in Article 96. The intellectual and practical 
boundaries between this specific procedure and the general 
process of political dialogue have not yet been systematically 
undetstood. Indeed, a learning process through the application of 
Article 96 has so far demonstrated the differing characteristics of 
the two articles. Political dialogue under Article 8 reflects the nor-
mal state of affairs in relations between the Community and the 
ACP states, whereas consultations under Article 96 arise as an 
exceptional, ad hoc event dealing with a political pathology. 
Political dialogue is preventive and proactive, continuous, bal-
anced, inclusive, infotmal, flexible, infinite. Consultations are 
reactive, one-off, unilateral, exclusive, formal, structured, finite. 
Political dialogue is ultimately the most effective "long-range, 
deterrent weapon" against potential governance problems and 
helps to avoid their deterioration through remedial measures. 
Consultations have been described as the "ultimate weapon". But 
this description subjugates the consultation procedure to an 
automatic logic of sanctions which fails to appreciate that there is 
an obligation for dialogue, that political dialogue continues dur-
ing this procedure, that assistance may be requested by the party 
involved to redress the situation and assistance granted, that a 
roadmap with commitments can be agreed, and that after all 
that, if appropriate measures ought to be taken they have to be 
proportional, progressive and certainly reversible. Article 96 con-
sultations may indeed be the "ulti-
mate" step but not a "weapon" 
since it is not meant as a punitive 
or coercive process. It is rather the 
ultimate remedy that the Union 
can apply in cases where the will 
of a government to respect the 
essential elements is lacking. 
In the end, is EU-ACP coop-
eration bettet with Article 8? 
Should we invent an Article 8 if 
we did not have it? The answer 
to both questions is undoubted-
ly yes. Next question: are we 
doing enough to make good use 
of this provision? ■ 
* Development Directorate General, European 
Commission. Relations with European and ACP 
institutions, civil society, NGOs unit. 
*?áflrl 
Associating civil society with political 
dialogue presents a particular challenge 
to established practice... their association 
with dialogue on political issues is 
sensitive and for governments in difficult 
circumstances may appear problematic. 
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The Cotonou Agreement contains an 
advanced set of provisions on the 
role of human rights, democracy and 
good governance in ACP-EU 
development cooperation. These 
provisions further refine the 
previous Lomé arrangements for 
addressing human rights concerns. 
They result from a long process of 
ACP-EU human rights dialogue, 
which started in the late 1970s and 
gradually intensified since. Despite 
the rich heritage and the evolution 
during a relatively long lead time, in 
practice many obstacles still impede 
effective implementation of the 
formal Cotonou human rights 
provisions. After a brief description 
of the formal framework, this article 
presents some of the factors that 
currently influence, negatively and 
positively, the prospects for human 
rights dialogue under Cotonou. 
While the formal framework is now 
adequate, effective implementation 
requires serious political and 
financial investments. 
Karin Arts* 
In July 2003 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament adopted the draft "Annual report on 
human rights in the world and the European Union's 
human rights policy" (covering the year 2002). The 
motion for a resolution contained in the draft of this 
important document qualifies Cotonou's human rights 
mechanism "as exemplary for its provisions on consulta-
tions, suspension and participation by civil society".' 
When considering the paper commitment, this qualifica-
tion is certainly justified as there are few to no other exam-
ples of development cooperation arrangements that incor-
porate human rights in such a leading way and that pro-
vide such detailed procedures for taking them up in prac-
tice. It is a tremendous achievement that ACP and EU 
states succeeded in jointly formulating this elaborate set of 
human rights provisions which provide a clear basis for 
constructive human rights action under Cotonou. 
However, when considering the implementation record 
so far, it is obvious that beyond the paper commitment 
controversies still abound. The recent debate about how to 
respond to the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and 
the (related) cancellation of the November 2002 ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly illustrate this.
2 Obviously, 
the scope for controversies to decrease, and the practice of 
regular human rights dialogue to increase, depends on a 
number of circumstances, including the approach taken, 
clarity of standards, proper dialogue and policy prepara-
tion and follow-up (by quality information and staff), and 
greater consistency and coherence. 
Political dialogue requires 
investment: 
meeting the human rights 
commitment of the Cotonou 
Agreement 
Negative and positive approaches: 
the formal framework 
For many people political dialogue in the first place has a neg-
ative connotation. They view it as a tool, to resort to in situations 
of severe human rights crisis only and as a prelude to punitive 
measures. However, it is important to stress that the Cotonou 
Agreement approaches political dialogue from a positive point 
of departure. According to its Article 9, respect for human rights 
is an integral part of sustainable development and shall be 
actively supported by the ACP-EU partnership. Like démocra-
tisation, the rule of law and good governance, human rights are 
a main component of the ongoing process of political dialogue 
that is supposed to take place between the parties to the 
Cotonou Agreement. The objective of this dialogue is "to 
exchange information, to fostet mutual undetstanding, and to 
facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agen-
das", and to prevent situations in which Cotonou's non-execu-
tion clause would be invoked (Art. 8). The latter entails a 
mandatory consultation mechanism that can be initiated once 
one party is of the opinion that another parry has failed to meet 
the basic standards of human rights, democratic principles and 
the rule of law, the so-called "essential elements'' of the 
Agreement. Such consultations are meant to thoroughly exam-
ine the situation "with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to 
the Parties" (Art. 96) and to identify remedial measures taken or 
to be taken by the party concerned. At the end of the consulta-
tion process "appropriate measures" may be embarked on, 
including, in the last resort, suspension of the Agreement. A 
similar procedure exists for addressing serious cases of corrup-
tion (Art. 97). The practice of consultations under Articles 96 
and 97, that is ad hoc political dialogue, has so far received 
much more attention and public exposure than the structural 
political dialogue envisaged under Article 8. Unfortunately, this 
reinforces the negative image of political dialogue, for the sake 
of credibility and as a matter of priority, the positive approach 
should be more strongly promoted and publicised. Stepping up 
structural political dialogue, and documenting and prominent-
ly publishing "best practices" are practical ways of doing this. 
The need for information 
While at first sight the Cotonou Agreement maps out suffi-
ciently clearly a human rights agenda, it still remains rather gen-
eral. The rough contours of standards to be met are provided, 
but these by no means extend to a roadmap ready for imple-
mentation at the national level. Obviously this was done on 
purpose, so as to create the necessary space for national priori-
tising and own policy choices. National human rights policy-
making and international monitoring of the results requires 
expertise and resources, intet alia for gathering information and 
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for undertaking relevant research and case studies. Simply 
keeping up to date with all relevant developments is a major 
challenge for both ACP and EU states and their separate and 
joint institutions. For policy to be effective though, it is indis-
pensable to closely monitor the situation on the ground and to 
assess the extent to which policy decisions are acted upon or 
remain adequate. The availability of quality information, man-
aged and interpreted by competent staff, is an absolute pre-
condition for ACP-EU human rights political dialogue to gain 
intensity and effect. Therefore, much more thought and 
resources should go into human rights data gathering. For, 
while it is clear that the Commission, the Councils (EU and 
ACP-EU), individual governments and parliamentary actors 
have different information needs, it is also a fact that there is a 
certain core that is relevant to all and that perhaps could be 
provided most efficiently through a central inter-institutional 
facility. After all, a lot of good quality human rights monitor-
ing is occurring in the practice of the Commission, the UN, 
relevant regional organisations, individual governments and 
non-governmental organisations. Rather than reinventing the 
wheel or duplicating efforts, it would be a fantastic achieve-
ment if ACP-EU human rights dialogue were to find ways to 
open up these hitherto rigidly separate sources of information 
to each other so that all could feed the central facility or files. 
A standard human rights impact assessment tool, for which 
recently some interesting groundwork was done by the Dutch 
Humanist Committee on Human Rights, might be useful too.
3
 
Transparency of procedures 
While there is little experience with the structural general 
political dialogue foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement, the ad-
hoc consultation mechanism has been used increasingly since 
mid-1998.'
1 This included consultations on the human rights 
situation in Togo, Niger, Haiti, Fiji, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia. 
Compared to what was in the past, the ad hoc mechanism clear-
ly enhanced the two-way process in responding to human rights 
violations. It also improved the transparency of EU decision-
making on punitive measures in response to human rights vio-
lations. At least the ACP states now have the formal option of 
presenting their side of the story and of calling for consultations 
themselves. The latter has not occurred as yet, but it should be 
self-evident that the Cotonou human rights standards apply 
equally to the EU member states and that occasionally it might 
be appropriate and strategically wise for an ACP state to call for 
consultations on a relevant situation in Europe. The Union has 
started the habit of putting in writing the considerations which 
lead it to request consultations, or which make it take certain 
measures at the end. Increasingly, these documents spell out 
what exactly, according to the EU, should be done to improve 
the situation to the extent that the measures taken could be 
ended. The latest example concerns the consultations on the 
Central African Republic (triggered by the coup of March 
2003), after which the EU presented its understanding of the 
commitments made by the transitional government during the 
consultation procedure through explicitly listing them, and by 
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adding specific time limits to some. Interestingly, in this case the 
parties created a follow-up committee for monitoring progress 
made, which is a welcome novelty.
 
5 Occasionally the ACP 
Group also writes up its views on the process of human rights 
dialogue.''The combination of these positions makes it easier for 
all parties concerned to assess the feasibility and the credibility 
of the outcomes of the political dialogue. 
In an attempt to clarify the role and meaning of Article 8 of 
the Cotonou Agreement, the May 2003 ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers adopted a set of "proposed guidelines" for structur-
al ACP-EU political dialogue.
7 While the document states not 
to intend elaborating on "the self-explanatory paragraphs" of 
Cotonou, but rathet to clarify the text and to come to agreed 
guidelines that could facilitate ACP-EU political dialogue, in 
its current form, unfortunately, the guidelines hardly add to 
the treaty text. Contrary to what was promised, the guidelines 
largely reproduce what is in the treaty already. In addition, 
they routinely refer to such items as flexibility, transparency, 
inclusiveness, legitimacy and 
process approach, without moving 
beyond the obvious. They could 
have contributed more meaningful-
ly by elaborating on the role of civil 
society in the process, and on the 
relationship to other procedures e.g. 
in the context of the United Nations 
or the African Union/NEPAD. This 
is a sadly missed opportunity indeed. 
Consistency and coherence: 
investment required 
The single most influential obsta-
cles to maximising ACP-EU human 
rights dialogue lie in the areas of (the 
lack of) consistency and coherence. 
As stated before, in the human rights 
domain, (positively oriented) struc-
tural political dialogue seems to be 
of lesser prominence than (usually 
negatively oriented) ad hoc political 
dialogue. Ad hoc dialogue targets a 
small number of ACP states. A large 
number of countries are left undis-
turbed although some of them also 
face serious human rights challenges. 
The EU decision to authorise the 
invitation of President Mugabe to 
Political unrest in Zimbabwe: a newspaper 
seller stands next to burnt and torn copies of 
the independent newspaper The Daily News. 
"There are few to no other examples of 
development cooperation arrangements that 
incorporate human rights in such a leading 
way and that provide such detailed 
procedures for taking up them up in 
practice... However, when considering the 
implementation record so far, it Is obvious 
that beyond the paper commitment 
controversies still abound. The recent debate 
about how to respond to the human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe and the (related) 
cancellation of the November 2002 ACP-EU 
Parliamentary Assembly illustrate this." 
the Franco-African Summit in Paris in February 2003, which 
was taken immediately after the renewal of sanctions against 
Zimbabwe which include visa restrictions targeting leading 
politicians (and army and police officials), is an example of two 
obviously inconsistent decisions. While the visa restrictions 
allow for exemptions for attending intergovernmental meetings 
"where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe", * 
the Franco-African Summit met this rather specific criterion 
insufficiently. On the ACP side, particular alertness is necessary 
in monitoring the human rights record of newer members of 
the ACP group such as Cuba. Consistency also implies that the 
EU and its member states apply the Cotonou human rights, 
democracy and governance standards to themselves and seri-
ously and actively monitor relevant developments in that 
regard. This again requires renewed political commitment and 
allocation of resources. The coherence requirement relates to 
the fact that human rights policy does not stand in isolation 
from other policy realms. For human rights dialogue to con-
tribute sustainably to improving human rights in particular 
countries, both ACP and EU actors should consider the human 
rights effects of policy lines they develop on other subjects. For 
the EU this has implications, for example, for its trade and 
development policies and the Common Agricultural Policies. 
The Commission has recently presented policy initiatives in 
both areas. Bringing in the human rights connection could 
strengthen the cases and would enhance coherence in EU poli-
cymaking. 
From the above it is clear that a further enhancement of 
ACP-EU human rights dialogue on both sides requires a step-
ping up of political commitment, so as to secure transparen-
cy, consistency and coherence. Material investments in the 
gathering and management of human rights information and 
for training of all staff potentially involved in directing, con-
ducting or implementing the results of ACP-EU political dia-
logue are also necessary. In order to keep the process feasible, 
the practice of continuously expanding the items on the 
ACP-EU political dialogue agenda should stop. A structural 
dialogue focusing on the essential core of human rights would 
be an ambitious enough beginning. Items such as migration, 
drugs or organised crime could always be added to the agen-
da later on. ■ 
* Karin Arts is Associate Professor of International Law anil Development at the Institute 
of Social Studies in 'the llague, 'Hie Netherlands, 'litis article builds on her hook Integrating 
Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention, Kluwer 
Law International, 2000, and subséquent research. 
1. Rapporteur Bob van Den Ilos. EP doc. prov. 20O2/20I KIND. 6 May 2003, 
PR/493327EN.doc, PE 329.281, p. 10, paragraph 7. 
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In this article, Andrew Bradley*, of 
the ACP Secretariat, offers a 
reflection on the importance of a 
structural political dialogue in ACP-
EU relations, a dialogue which has 
been reinforced under Cotonou. 
He looks at measures being 
undertaken to operationalise the 
dialogue foreseen in the Agreement, 
and to come to a common 
understanding of what it entails. 
He also looks at the implications for 
intra-ACP dialogue, and at how 
political dialogue can extend 
beyond the ACP-EU relationship. 
The ACP Group considers political dialogue as an exchange of 
views that presupposes the presence of at least two parties. It can 
take varied forms, whether political, social or cultural and is con-
ducted at different levels, international, regional, or national. It 
often constitutes the basis for othet types of dialogue, and could 
extend to cover social, cultutal and economic issues. 
Political dialogue could facilitate agreement on development 
priorities, and allows ACP states to assess progress on issues relat-
ed to, inter alia, human rights, democratic principles, good gov-
ernance and the rule of law. Dialogue is an important instrument 
to address new areas that have a major impact on the develop-
ment of ACP states, such as peace, conflict prevention, manage-
ment and resolution, arms trade, migration, etc. 
ACP-EC political dialogue 
The ACP-EC Cotonou Partnership Agreement gave the politi-
cal dimension a more prominent role in ACP-EC relations. 
During the successive Lomé Conventions, in particular Lomé IV 
and Lomé IV(bis), the political dynamics between the ACP and 
the EU evolved to such an extent that both parties agreed to its 
subsequent institutionalisation in the Cotonou Agreement. The 
Agreement provides the basic, broad guidelines for comprehen-
sive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commit-
ments on both sides between the two signatory parties. The adop-
tion by the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of a joint paper on 
"Guidelines for ACP-EU political dialogue within the context of 
Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement" at its 28 th Session in 
Brussels in May 2003, is a clear commitment by both parties not 
only to operationalise and implement the provisions of Cotonou, 
but also to confirm the importance of political dialogue in the 
ACP-EC relationship. 
Meaningful political dialogue will enhance ACP-EC coop-
eration, and by extension, increase the impact on poverty 
eradication consistent with the objectives of sustainable devel-
opment, and the gradual integration of the ACP countries 
into the world economy. The Guidelines emphasise the fol-
lowing key principles in ACP-EC political dialogue under 
Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement: flexibility, transparency, 
inclusiveness, continuity, and process approach. 
The Guidelines dedicate a full chapter to the selection criteria 
for the choice of subjects for discussion during political dialogue. 
Furthermore, given their important role in the development of 
ACP states, and in concurrence with the provisions of the 
Political dialogue 
one of the main tools for 
effective ACP-EC cooperation 
Political dialogue 
and Cotonou 
Cotonou Agreement, non-state actors (NSAs) are identified in 
the Guidelines as one of the actors in ACP-EC political dialogue. 
One of the key objectives of the ACP Group is to ensure the full 
and timely implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The ACP 
Group has instigated a process to pursue a common understanding 
with the EU on all issues related to political dialogue, and in partic-
ular the remaining Articles of Title II (The Political Dimension) and 
Articles 96, 97 and 98 of the Agreement. The objectives of political 
dialogue should mirror the principal objectives of the Cotonou 
Agreement, and facilitate a common understanding and interpreta-
tion of the issues concerned, which will enhance the partnership and 
prevent a situation where one side has to resort to unilateral actions. 
Intra-ACP political dialogue 
Meaningful dialogue at the ACP-EC level necessitates intra-
ACP dialogue, and the parameters for this are enshrined in the 
Georgetown Agreement of 1975, as amended, the Libreville 
Declaration, the Santo Domingo Declaration and Plan of 
Action, and the Nadi Declaration, as adopted by ACP Heads of 
State and Government. To prepare the ACP Group for effective 
and sustained dialogue with the EU, the ACP Council of 
Ministers adopted a "Framework and general principles for intra-
ACP political dialogue" at its 76th Session in Brussels in 
December 2002, which sets the broad parameters for political 
dialogue among ACP States. Having agreed on these important 
building blocks for political dialogue, the political dimension of 
the Cotonou Agreement can further evolve and enhance the 
ACP-EC Partnetship, and in particular its inclusiveness. 
The Framework emphasises the fact that intra-ACP dialogue will 
observe, inter alia, the principles of sovereignty, equality, ACP soli-
darity and unity. It looks at the objectives, range of applications, 
form, levels and issues to be covered during intra-ACP dialogue. 
The ACP Group is currently reflecting on a number of propos-
als to strengthen and better equip and prepare the Group for 
Refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Peace and security is one of the subjects for discussion during political dialogue. 
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political challenges, opportunities and threats. The fast-evolving 
global political landscape, the profound internal and external 
changes to the EU, principle partner of the ACP Group, and the 
commitment to further enhance ACP solidarity and unity are suf-
ficient reasons for the Group to enhance and expand the modali-
ties and mechanisms for intra-ACP dialogue. The inclusiveness 
and scope of intra-ACP dialogue were further underscored by the 
first meetings of ACP Ministers for Research (Science and 
Technology) and Culture. Meetings of ACP Ministers of 
Migration, Environment, Health and Education are also being 
planned. 
Improving modalities and mechanisms 
The "Framework and general principles for intra-ACP politi-
cal dialogue" contains a number of proposals to improve the 
modalities and mechanisms for political dialogue. The ACP 
Council of Ministers mandated the Committee of Ambassadors 
to pursue the following proposals: 
• establishment of an ACP Early Warning Mechanism (EWM); 
• creation of a "Peer Group"; and 
• improved utilisation of ACP institutions, or institutional changes. 
In pursuit of these proposals, the ACP Group plans to better 
equip itself to deal with internal issues that require attention, 
prior to any possible action by the EU. The Group's objective is 
to become a more responsible, credible and reliable partner in 
relations with the EU, and any other relations it might pursue. 
ACP regional integration organisations 
The expanded nature of the Partnership Agreement necessitates a 
closer working relationship between ACP regional integration 
otganisations and the ACP Group, in particular the ACP General 
Secretariat. In the context of political dialogue, the ACP Group 
relies primarily on ACP regional integration organisations for the 
implementation of actions related to conflict prevention and man-
agement, preventative diplomacy and peacekeeping in the respec-
tive regions. Forty-eight (48) ACP states are members of the African 
Union (AU), and all matters relating to early warning mechanisms, 
preventative diplomacy and peacekeeping in the 
African states of the ACP Group are coordinated 
and managed by the AU's Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution. There is close cooperation and coor-
dination between the ACP General Secretariat 
and the various organs of the AU, and the AU's 
conflict prevention and management efforts are 
fully supported by the ACP Group. 
ACP regional integration organisations will 
also fulfill a key role during the second phase of 
ACP-EC negotiations for Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), to begin from 
September 2003. The integration and impor-
tance of these organisations in the ACP-EC 
dialogue process should not be underestimated, 
since they should form the building blocks for 
positions and actions taken by the ACP Group. 
Participation of non-state actors (NSAs) 
The Cotonou Agreement enshrines the participation of NSAs 
in the ACP-EC relationship. By agreeing and ratifying the 
Agreement, ACP states fully acknowledged the role of NSAs in 
the development of ACP states. The patticipation of NSAs is to 
be facilitated at the national and regional levels, although par-
ticipation of NSAs at the level of the ACP Council of Ministers 
and Summits of ACP Heads of State and Government is also 
assured. Integration of NSA participation is a process, and the 
ACP Group and the EU have agreed to the setting-up of 
Steering Committees at ACP national and regional levels to 
ensure the participation of NSAs in decisions relating to 
European Development Fund (EDF) resources earmarked for 
NSAs. Furthetmore, the ACP General Secretariat is in the 
process of producing a NSA Guide, which should facilitate NSA 
participation in the Agreement. 
Dialogue outside the ACP-EC framework 
The 3rd Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government held 
in Nadi, Fiji in July 2002 mandated the ACP Group to strength-
en the existing relationship with the EU, and to explore the pos-
sibility of expanding its relations with other countries and groups 
of countries. The ACP Group cooperated closely with the G-77 
Group during the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in Johannesburg during August 2002, and Canada par-
ticipated in the proceedings of the first Meeting of ACP Ministers 
of Culture, in Dakar, Senegal in June 2003. Furthermore, at the 
5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003, 
the ACP Group, AU and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
formed an Alliance to jointly defend their interests at the Cancún 
Conference. 
The mimetic strength of the ACP Group, its desire to become 
one of the principal spokespersons of the developing world, and 
the stated objective to enhance the role and visibility of the 
Group on the international scene, warrant a focus beyond the 
ACP-EC relationship, of course without neglecting or down-
grading existing relations. The focus in pursuing new relations is 
on the complementary nature that these relations might have on 
existing activities and programmes. Poverty reduction is one of 
the key objectives of the ACP Group, and by expanding its inter-
national focus through dialogue, the chances of achieving this 
objective is maximized. 
Conclusions 
The ACP Group is committed to take full advantage of the 
many possibilities and opportunities that dialogue offers, and the 
Group is at present actively engaged in putting in place the build-
ing blocks to ensure a sustained and continuous dialogue among 
its member states, with the EU and other states and groupings of 
states. Dialogue, and in particular political dialogue, is an indis-
pensable tool that, if fully utilised, would ensure that the ACP 
Group takes its rightful place in the international world order. ■ 
* Expert, Political Dialogue anti Relations with International Organizations, Political Affairs 
and Human Development Department. ACP Secretariat. 'Ille views expressed in this 
article are the author's own, and not necessarily those of the ACP. 
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In the eyes of many observers, 
the intensification of political 
dialogue between ACP countries 
and the EU depends on the 
inclusion of civil society, and in 
particular non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), to the 
greatest extent possible. 
NGOs working for development 
can contribute considerably 
towards improving the 
partnership and alleviating 
poverty if a genuine effort is 
made to involve them in this 
political dialogue, explains 
Gérard Karlshausen*. 
what role can development 
NGOs play? 
EU delegatlons in ACP countries can play a vital role. It is important that they are trained in and open to 
dialogue, and that this dialogue goes beyond the contingencies of administrative project monitoring or 
financing procedures. 
Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement expressly provides that 
representatives of civil society organisations shall be associated 
with political dialogue. Thus, development NGOs (DNGOs) 
surely have a role to play, having both a wealth of expertise and 
partnership networks in ACP countries and links with 
European citizens. 
However, as well as being based on the principal of solidar-
ity, their participation must also stem from a political percep-
tion of what the Cotonou Agreement is: the expression of a 
joint European and ACP desire for cooperation between soci-
eties at all levels. DNGOs from the North must contribute 
not only their knowledge of the South, but also the analyses, 
attitudes and demands of the European population groups 
that they mobilise. 
Involving European citizens 
This requires DNGOs to develop their relationships with 
their members and their relevant public concerning European 
issues. In this regard, it is crucial that people are educated on 
the subject of development, and more effective measures 
must be taken to inform and mobilise public opinion. It is 
also important that DNGOs can constantly demonstrate 
theit legitimacy and added value vis-à-vis other actors in the 
field of cooperation. Their legitimacy depends primarily on 
their ability to elaborate propositions and mobilise public 
opinion, while their added value depends in particular on 
their ability to convert this mobilisation and these proposals 
into actions. This also means that the European institutions 
must not regard DNGOs merely as "subcontractors" in the 
implementation of the Agreement, but as genuine actors of 
European civil society, fully associated with political 
dialogue. 
The involvement of DNGOs from both North and South 
in political dialogue clearly also requires that they have access 
to research tools so as to be able to contribute analyses and 
concrete facts. The DNGOs' presence alongside the popula-
tions and their partnership with organisations in the South is 
an invaluable advantage. 
Opportunities and culture of consultation 
If DNGOs are to be recognised as entirely separate actors in 
dialogue, genuine opportunities for consultation must exist! 
On a preliminary level, EU delegations in ACP countries can 
play an important role. This is clearly the level at which real 
consultation opportunities must be created. The complexity 
and the sometimes sensitive nature of any political dialogue 
constitutes a strong argument for the participation of 
European DNGOs not to be limited, as is too often the case, 
to formal, restricted and sporadic consultations. Their 
approach will be less than wholehearted unless they can see the 
impact of their involvement in dialogue reflected in decisions 
made by politicians. There is still some way to go in this 
regard; a genuine culture of consultation must be implement-
ed which respects both the DNGOs' autonomy and capacity 
as critics and the tole of decision-maker which ultimately tests 
with the authorities. 
Effective, acknowledged participation by European 
DNGOs in political dialogue within the framework of the 
Cotonou Agreement can only benefit all participants, aiding 
implementation of the Agreement for the benefit of equitable 
and sustainable development, as well as making it a real instru-
ment of cooperation between European and ACP societies. ■ 
* CNCD, Centre for Development Cooperation, and Chairman of the Belgian CONCORD 
platform. 
(2ΕΓ) the Courier ACP-EU n°200 september-october 2003 Civil society 
politica 
in the C 
Previous EU-ACP Conventions were 
about aid and trade, and political 
engagement was not a feature. In 
the Cotonou Agreement, exactly 
what political dialogue will 
amount to remains something of a 
mystery, says Nancy Kachingwe of 
MWENGO, an NGO working to 
strengthen the capacities of non-
governmental organisations in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. 
Cotonou's signatories need to 
explain their thinking in wanting 
to strengthen the political dialogue 
in the Agreement, and clarify what 
it is expected to deliver. 
Political dialogue within the Cotonou Agreement tends to add 
one more layer to the many existing ones. To complicate matters, 
political dialogue is now also taking place regionally — through 
regional bodies like SADC, the African Union and through initia-
tives like the NEPAD peer review mechanism. As social justice 
activists, we welcome any initiatives that might inject more integri-
ty and honesty into politics. But how can the Cotonou Agreement 
help us to respond to the major geo-political questions of the day? 
What added value? 
The move to strengthen political dialogue between the EU and 
the ACP countries needs to earn credibility and legitimacy, and 
this can only be done if it is shown to be relevant to the problems 
that affect the lives of ACP citizens and if it responds to the criti-
cal issues that are shaping our world. It is difficult to shake off the 
image that political dialogue will simply be more of the same — 
meetings, summits and conferences that deliver little. 
These are important questions for civil society before engaging 
with political dialogue. People continue to demand that we be con-
sulted— and listened to - when governments are "dialoguing" on 
questions that affect their lives. But organised civil society needs 
also to think critically about how it positions itself in relation to the 
An elusive reality... 
dialogue 
otonou Agreement 
Strengthening EU-ACP political dialogue needs to earn credibility and legitimacy, 
and that can only be done it it is shown to be relevant to the problems that 
affect the lives of ACP citizens 
dialogue under Cotonou. Civil society cannot engage unquestion-
ingly in the process; its involvement cannot bring added value if 
the political dialogue itself has no added value. 
Political dialogue is a dialogue between political entities. But it 
is difficult to know what political entities we are dealing with. In 
the case of the EU, which are the political entities we are talking 
about? In the case of the ACP Group, outside Cotonou, the group 
does not exist as a political entity, and those that we are trying to 
build - sub-regional blocs and unions - are minor players in 
Cotonou. Which framework is most effective? 
The idea of strengthening the political dimension of the 
Cotonou Agreement did not come from civil society. The main 
fear was that it was simply going to be about (i) sanctions and (ii) 
conditionalities. There was debate, but rarely about the overall 
soundness of adding this dimension to what was essentially a coop-
eration agreement. Despite its intention to take a holistic approach 
to development, there is a compartmentalisation of issues in the 
Cotonou Agreement. Social development is dealt with through 
aid, economic development through trade and political/gover-
nance/security issues through political dialogue. Three different 
sets of ministries are involved - economic/finance, foreign affairs 
and trade/industry. When do all these come together for a coordi-
nated response to the development challenges of ACP countries? 
Isn't this what political dialogue should do? 
It is difficult to create a participatory framework for political dia-
logue unless that dialogue approaches issues the way citizens do: in 
terms of practical, day-to-day questions rathet than in the way that 
states do - in abstract, technical and often narrowly selective ways. 
Gaining credibility 
Political dialogue is important, particularly if we are able to 
bring an end to conflicts and the militarisation of our societies, 
and make life more secure and happy than it is for millions of 
people. But many questions - indeed doubts - arise in relation to 
the political dialogue in the Cotonou Agreement; should we be 
creating new ftameworks for dealing with human rights, democ-
racy and security issues or should we be trying to support those 
that are being generated from within the ACP regions? Without 
dealing with broader issues of power relations between the North 
and South - raising questions about the policies of the EU as 
much as we question ACP governments - can this dialogue gain 
the credibility that would merit the participation of citizens? 
Many othet clarifications are needed, such as who the actors should 
be. But the main problems remain conceptual: the lack of buy-in and 
perceptions, possibly mistaken, that this is an EU imposition, has 
given this venture a somewhat inauspicious start. We need more cre-
ative approaches that connect governments to citizens, particularly 
those groups which are under-represented. We need dialogue where 
there is not only frankness, but where rhetoric and spin is replaced by 
substance. Dialogue has to be as much about listening as it is about 
talking. And for governments, not so much talking to each other but 
talking with othets who might have something new to offer. ■ 
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The political dialogue between 
the 92 nations of the European 
Union and the ACP, underpinned 
by the Cotonou Agreement offers 
a model for the future, says 
Hanja Maij-Weggen, who was 
until recently Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) and 
Co-Chairman of the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly's (JPA) 
Political Affairs Committee. 
Underlining the new approach to 
cooperation in the Agreement, 
is respect for human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule 
of law, and good governance. 
These must be subjects for regular 
discussion, and the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly can play a 
particularly important role. 
The role of the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly: 
political dialogue 
and the democratic opportunity 
In Europe, the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 
1989 marked a crucial moment as the Iron Curtain was razed. 
European unification roars ahead as the EU enlarges from 
15 to 25 member states. A constitution for the EU has been 
prepared by the Convention to replace the old Treaties and to 
strengthen Europe's voice on the global stage, create more 
transparent accountability and reform the institutional struc­
tures. 
Creating democratic opportunities 
The creation of a genuine global partnership for sustainable 
development is one of the main weapons in the fight against 
terrorism. However, the pursuit of this aim must be based on 
the core principles of respect for human rights, rule of law, 
good governance, democracy, transparency and the fight 
against corruption. To this end, the nurturing of parliamen­
tary democracies is essential to promote the freedom of the 
individual, enable economic growth and secure prosperity for 
all nations. 
How can the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) respond 
to these needs? Does it offer a new democratic opportunity for 
developing nations? 
Under the leadership of the previous ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly Co-President, John Corrie, founda­
tions were laid to reform the Assembly's workings. The 
Assembly has become more parliamentary, democratic and 
efficient, making it better able to fulfil the tasks it was set 
under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement — and the chal­
lenges developed and developing nations together face. 
New cooperation format in Cotonou 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement led to several major 
changes in ACP-EU relations, which should: 
• enhance and reinforce the political dimension by establish­
ing the Joint Parliamentary Assembly; 
• involve civil society, the private sector and other non-state 
players; 
• confirm poverty reduction as a key objective within the con­
text of objectives and strategies agreed internationally; 
• create an innovative economic and trade cooperation frame­
work with the aim of creating six Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs); 
• rationalise the financial instruments and establish a new sys­
tem of "rolling programming". 
The European Parliament signals its support 
The European Parliament's assent to the Cotonou 
Agreement on 16 January 2002 sent a strong signal of support 
for the new format of ACP-EU cooperation. Under Article 17 
of the Agreement the role of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 
as a consultative body, is to: 
• promote democratic processes through dialogue and consul­
tation; 
• facilitate greater undetstanding between the peoples of the 
EU and those of the ACP states and raise public awareness 
of development issues; 
• discuss issues pertaining to development and the ACP-EU 
Partnership; 
• adopt resolutions and make recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers with a view to achieving the objectives 
of the Agreement. 
Endorsement of the Corrie Reform Programme has led to 
the creation of three Standing Committees with specific areas 
of responsibility to replace the old system of ad hoc working 
groups. The three broad areas covered are: Political Affairs, 
Economic Development, Finance and Trade, and Social 
Affairs and the Environment. 
This new structure will enable the Assembly to operate 
on the basis of continuous parliamentary business, and pro­
vide a forum for more wide-ranging debate before and 
between sessions. The task of the Co-Chairman of the 
Political Affairs Standing Committee is to reinforce the 
political dialogue. 
This reform, alongside a number of othet key changes, 
should bring EU development policy closer to the people, 
both in Europe and the developing world, at a time when 
deeper cooperation is more necessary than ever. 
The establishment of the Standing Committee on politi­
cal affairs allows the Joint Parliamentary Assembly to main­
tain an ongoing system to monitor democracy, the rule of 
law and good governance. This will complement the role of 
regional assemblies and offers a twin-track, parallel struc­
ture for political dialogue between ACP and EU partners, 
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Photo European Parliament 
enabling differences to be resolved ahead of full Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly plenary sessions. 
By tackling issues immediately, the Standing Committee 
structure provides an additional avenue for debate that should 
allow the full Assembly to focus on areas where solutions 
remain unclear. By acting both as an early warning mechanism 
and an initial arena for debate, Standing Committees ensure 
continuous dialogue between ACP and EU politicians and 
Council members, and provide the chance to gauge opinion 
on issues from the outset. 
If problems persist and dialogue reaches an impasse at either 
the Committee or regional assembly level, then the debate 
should be taken forward to the full plenary. But all parties 
must recognise that such a step could lead to a much-increased 
chance of applying Article 96 consultation procedures along 
with appropriate measures. This real risk of sanctions would 
focus minds on resolving disputes early on and encourage all 
parties to use the Committees as forums for real agreement, 
and not as a way to delay or avoid results. 
It is now up to politicians and ministers from both EU and 
ACP countries to make the revised system work. This means 
real commitment to a common belief, as outlined eloquently 
in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 
that democracy and good governance are preconditions for 
development. The logic is clear: democracy is the driving force 
for good governance, which in tum creates the political stabil-
ity necessary for economic growth, through development aid 
and ultimately private sector inward investment. 
In the new constitution for the EU the European 
Development Fund's budget will be brought under EU scruti-
ny- combined with the European Parliament's existing budg-
etary and co-decision powers over EU development policy. 
This will give MEPs increased potential to match words with 
deeds. ■ 
The 6th session of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly took 
place in Rome from 11 to 15 October. For the first time, 
the Joint Parliamentary Assembly examined reports 
proposed by the new Standing Committees on: 
- rights of children, and child soldiers in particular, 
- conflict prevention, the peace process and post-conflict 
management, 
- sustainable management and conservation of natural 
resources in ACP countries in the framework of the 
programming of the ninth European Development Fund, 
- use of the European Development Fund. 
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When the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA) was signed in 
June 2000 a number of its 
innovations were heralded with 
much fanfare. Chief amongst 
these was probably the explicit 
importance given to political 
dialogue. During the "Future of 
Lomé" debate that preceded the 
negotiations for the Agreement, 
the principle of partnership and 
whether the ACP-EU partnership 
could ever be one of equals, 
was discussed at length in a 
variety of fora. The inclusion in 
the Agreement of a chapter on 
the political dimension was seen 
as a recognition that the long-
standing ACP-EU partnership 
had reached a new level of 
maturity. 
James Mackie* 
Cape Verdian immigrants living 
in the slums in Lisbon, Portugal. 
"The issue of migration shall be the subject of 
in-depth dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU 
Partnership" (Article 13). 
The evidence for this "mature partnership", was 
essentially simple: henceforth the partners would recognise 
explicitly that they had to have a political relationship as well 
as a trade and aid one. If the partnership was to get away 
from a dependency relationship, born out of the post-
colonial era, then it had to be broad, far-reaching and 
involve frank, two-way dialogue. The dialogue needed to 
cover both a number of basic principles that the partners 
agreed on, but also to make provision for areas of disagree-
ment. It would be a prime tool for increasing mutual under-
standing and enhancing cooperation on an on-going basis so 
as to promote achievement of the aims of the Agreement. 
The dialogue would have to be flexible, inclusive, open and 
transparent and cover a wide variety of subjects including 
the so-called essential and fundamental elements. This is all 
captured in Title II (The Political Dimension) of the 
Cotonou Agreement, just a few pages from the start of the 
treaty. 
But now, three years later, with the CPA finally ratified 
and fully in force, one has to admit that this bright new 
dawn perceived back then has turned into a rather cloudy, if 
not to say drizzly, day with occasional thunderstorms. ACP-
EU political dialogue has undoubtedly occurred in various 
fora and formats, but it has also hit major blockages and 
raised considerable doubts and fears. These essentially 
revolve around what happens when dialogue breaks down 
and the use of sanctions under Article 96. For some this is 
the new conditionality hidden behind the partnership. 
Partnership 
and political dialogue 
under the Cotonou Agreement 
Political dialogue 
and Cotonou 
©Jan Banning/Panos Pictures 
The Political Dimension provisions of Cotonou 
It is worth pausing to consider what is and what is not in 
Cotonou's Title II. The first key point to underline is that Article 
96, to which many people refer when they discuss Cotonou polit-
ical dialogue, is not in Title II, but in the Final Provisions at the 
end of the Agreement. It deals with the so-called "formal consul-
tations" (called by either party if they feel the essential ot funda-
mental elements of the Convention have been broken and which 
can lead to "appropriate measures" including sanctions). Article 8, 
which is in Title II (Articles 8-13), is the basic political dialogue 
article. It describes the objectives of political dialogue, what it 
should be about, and how it should be conducted. Therefore 
strictly speaking, Cotonou's "political dialogue" refers to Article 8 
dialogue. In contrast, Article 96 is really not part ofthat dialogue, 
but more of a final check, post-dialogue, between partners in a sit-
uation of crisis or major disagreement before one takes "appropri-
ate measures" against the other. Invoking Article 96 in fact means 
that political dialogue has broken down. This is a key point which 
is regularly forgotten. 
Crucially, Title II of the Cotonou Agreement also contains five 
further articles which are all about substance. These include Article 
9 on the essential and fundamental elements; Article 11 on conflict 
prevention; Article 12 on the coherence of EC policies with the 
Cotonou Agreement and finally Article 13 on migration policy. 
The association of Article 96 with the Cotonou "political dia-
logue" of course arises because it can only be invoked in cases of 
violation of the essential elements which are spelled out in Title II 
and more specifically Article 9. These concern principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Article 
9 also refers to good governance as a fundamental 
element of the CPA, which, if violated by cases of 
serious corruption, could provoke the use of the twin 
Article 97. Furthermore, both Articles 8 and 96 have 
specific links with each other in that both contain a 
clear indication that the negotiators hoped that reg-
ular Article 8 political dialogue between the parties 
would help avoid the need for the use of Article 96. 
In sum, while Article 96 (and 97) are formally not 
part of the CPA political dialogue provisions in Title 
II, they are clearly and explicitly linked to it by both 
the subject with which they deal and by the 
Agreement's expressed hope that more dialogue will 
lead to less need for the use of sanctions. 
So what has the experience been so far of the use 
of Cotonou's Articles 96 and 8? 
Consultations on the essential elements -
Article 96 
Article 96 is an inheritance from the past Lomé 
Convention's Article 366a. From the EU point of 
view this Article works quite well. It allows the EU, 
in a fairly tidy and well regulated way, to state its 
opposition to certain events in ACP states and pull 
out its support in protest. Providing the EU follows 
the procedure laid out in the Agreement, the ACP 
state in question cannot legally say very much other than to dis-
agree and protest their innocence. At that point the dispute set-
tlement procedure (Art. 98) could possibly be invoked though 
this is rarely done. The only real difficulty for the EU is to decide 
what would be an "appropriate measure". Cotonou does not 
shed any light on this question, but in the past this has usually 
involved the suspension of aid. In extreme situations, the EU 
might decide to go further and move out of the CPA framework 
into the legal framework of the EU Common Foreign and 
Security Policy where it can unilaterally decide to impose other 
forms of sanctions. 
For the ACP these components of the Cotonou Agreement are 
another matter. The ACP have never invoked Article 96 against 
an EU member state and it is hard to see this happening. On a 
purely practical level it would not be easy to get 77 member 
states of the ACP Group to agree on such action nor on what 
sanctions to use. It would require a major effort to mobilise sup-
port, yet even the UK going to war in Iraq without a UN reso-
lution split the ACP, with some states supporting the US-UK 
coalition. This inequality between the ability of the Cotonou 
partners to back criticism of the other side with action is where 
the limits of the concept of equal partners are reached. 
Various Article 96 (and Lomé 366a) cases have arisen over the 
past five years, some still on-going, with six cases launched under 
the Cotonou Agreement. Most cases arose after coups d'états 
(Fiji, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Guinea Bissau, Niger...), flawed 
elections (Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire,Togo...) and human rights abus-
es (Liberia, Zimbabwe...). The most recent case followed the 
15 March coup in the Central African Republic. One case stands 
out: EU-Zimbabwe relations since January 2002. Zimbabwe has 
experienced neither a coup nor an unconstitutional change of gov-
ernment. The sanctions imposed by the EC in February 2002 have 
not achieved the desired result, but the case has attracted a lot of 
media attention and caused considerable diplomatic difficulties. It 
is also the first occasion the EU proposed the use of Article 8 dia-
logue and then moved to Article 96 consultations, thereby inad-
vertently confirming in many people's minds the links between 
these two separate sets of provisions (see box on next page). 
Some cases are viewed as having achieved positive results. In 
particular the consultations with Côte d'Ivoire in 2000-2001, 
and with Niger in 1999 are cited. In both these cases the process 
moved along similar lines. The consultations seem to have pro-
duced honest exchanges of view with the EU indicating its bot-
tom line and the ACP government then proving itself willing to 
make some changes. Compromises were worked out with agree-
ment on steps to be taken and a timetable to normalise the situ-
ation. These agreed stages were then undertaken in a gradual 
fashion with the EU reciprocating step by step with re-establish-
ing normal relations, in parallel to agreed moves towards démoc-
ratisation and re-establishment of the rule of law by the ACP 
government. 
Article 8 political dialogue 
Analysis of what has happened with Article 8 dialogue is not as 
easy because, unlike Article 96, neither the ACP nor the EC keep 
a systematic record of such cases. The cases are also inherently less 
dramatic and do not grab the headlines. Equally, so far, there is less 
academic interest in and analysis of Article 8 dialogue. 
Discussion with both ACP and EC officials, however, reveal 
that there are various difficulties and reservations with establish-
ing and running a successful Article 8 dialogue. Some of these are 
internal to the preparations on each side and others relate to the 
dialogue itself. 
The EU in particular has a number of difficulties relating to 
the institutional structure of the Union and to the changing 
nature of the tasks of the Commission. In due course, with expe-
rience, some of these will no doubt become less of an obstacle 
though others require major changes to inter-institutional 
relations. To list a few: 
• This is a new role for many EC Delegations which are more used 
to development cooperation work and the administration of aid; 
• The need for the EC to involve member states: this is unfamil-
iar terrain and officials are often unsure how to start and how 
to agree on agendas and common positions; furthermore EU 
member states' views on each ACP country vary a lot; 
• The role for the EC in the dialogue is not clear to many - a 
coordinating role seems evident, but it should not just be the 
secretariat for member states; 
• Who should lead the process: the EC Delegation, the EU 
Presidency, the EU-Heads of Mission, or the EU-Troika? 
• There are further complications with Council working groups 
back in Brussels: should it be the ACP Group or for instance the 
Africa Group and which one should lead? Both clearly want a 
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say; the officials in each Group are often different and so there 
is a tendency towards inconsistency and lack of continuity in 
views; 
• The EU's need to first agree a common position tends to stul-
tify dialogue with ACP governments once it starts; the EU 
spokesperson can thus feel hampered in the dialogue by hav-
ing to "stick to the agreed script". 
Article 8 dialogue further tends to impact on EC develop-
ment cooperation programmes and member states' bilateral aid 
programmes in different ways. For example, in Zimbabwe some 
EC officials wanted to finalise and approve, but not sign the 
country's Country Strategy Paper as a "carrot" in the diplomat-
ic negotiation. The EU member states opposed this on the 
grounds that this would give confusing signals. At the same 
time it was not the EU member states which had to live with 
the consequences of this decision as they could choose to stop 
their own bilateral programmes when it suited them. 
Such problems mean that some commentators on the EC side 
are raising questions on the way forward. For instance: How is 
Article 8 dialogue different from what went on quietly in the 
past in various fora? Why all this fuss about political dialogue 
now? Maybe it would be best not to refer to Article 8 at all and 
just get on with the dialogue informally as before? 
On the ACP side the concerns are rather different. There is 
first and foremost among many ACP officials unease about 
many of the subjects the EU wants to raise (human rights, good 
governance etc) in the dialogue. Even though the principle of 
dialogue and the essential elements were agreed in Cotonou 
these are clearly difficult subjects to handle when the implication 
of the EC wanting to raise them is precisely that they are not sat-
isfied. There is a view that dialogue can easily tip over into inter-
ference. There are questions about openness, transparency and 
the involvement of civil society; there is sensitivity about dis-
cussing difficult subjects in public and with the involvement of 
other ACP countries. Losing face publicly can also be seen as 
undermining a government's ability to govern. Thus, for many 
ACP states, these aspects of the Cotonou Agreement and any 
EU insistence on discussing essential elements constitute a new 
form of conditionality. Furthermore, if the EU does insist on 
raising essential elements issues within an Article 8 dialogue 
framework, as in Zimbabwe, it is not surprising that Article 8 
quickly acquires the reputation of being a prelude to Article 96. 
So what then can be done to improve the use made of Article 
8? This question does need to be addressed, because there are 
also dangers in not making full use of the opening for dialogue 
that Cotonou offers, as ultimately dialogue is clearly the way 
forward. Two possible approaches to explore might help in this 
tespect: 
1. Attempt to defuse the difficult association that has become 
established in certain quarters between Article 8 political 
dialogue on the one hand and the start of a process that leads 
Zimbabwe - The slippery slope from Article 8 to Article 96 
The process followed in the case of Zimbabwe is noteworthy because it is the first time the EU tried to go through an Article 8 political dialogue 
in the hope of avoiding the use of Article 96. Unfortunately, with Zimbabwe, the EU's proposal to hold Article 8 dialogue got nowhere and this 
early failure to find a way to use political dialogue as a way out of a disagreement has certainly made it more difficult to get Article 8 dialogue 
off the ground elsewhere. It is hard to point to any one reason for this failure, but it is instructive to run through the main steps of the case. 
The process started in mid-2000, just months after the signature of Cotonou. The EU first took quite a long time to agree and prepare a com-
mon position in, at times, a difficult internal discussion that was marked by member states taking very different positions on how to proceed. In 
early 2001 the EU then proposed to the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) an Article 8 dialogue on issues relating to violations of essential ele-
ments. The latter at first demurred, then accepted the principle of the dialogue but insisted that the agenda first had to be agreed. Five months 
later, by the time the GoZ finally agreed to the agenda, the EU Council was losing patience and in June 2001 issued what was effectively an ulti-
matum insisting on a rapid start. By October, with the Article 8 dialogue still not having started, the EU decided to proceed to Article 96 consul-
tations. After further disagreements about dates and modalities, these were then finally held in January 2002. Not satisfied with the response of 
the GoZ in the talks, the EU gave notice and then closed the consultations, passing rapidly to a decision on sanctions on 22 February. A year later 
with no progress on the essential element concerns raised, the sanctions have recently been renewed for a further year. 
In retrospect it seems that the Article 8 dialogue never had much chance of succeeding in this case. Both sides at times took aggressive and 
uncompromising stances, there was a fundamental disagreement about the key issue to be resolved: human rights violations and the breakdown 
of law and order in the EU's view, or land reform in the view of the GoZ, and impatience on both sides with what each saw as instances of high-
handed behaviour and arrogance from the other. Therefore it is clear that the case fell well outside the spirit of the open and constructive dia-
logue envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. In such cases, where the differences are so great and there is insufficient political will to compro-
mise, Article 8 dialogue simply cannot even take off, let alone progress and so help the parties avoid Article 96 consultations. 
A final note on the sanctions against Zimbabwe, which are of two two types: 
• Suspension of EDF and EU member state aid: this had a serious impact on the government budget. There was an attempt to maintain projects 
that circumvented the government and directly supported the poor. 
• Embargo on arms and travel ban (in the CFSP framework). The impact of these on President Mugabe or the GoZ is hard to measure. The trav-
el ban has proved a running sore in Africa-EU diplomacy and both EU and African nations have suffered as a result of the impact the travel ban 
has had on international discussions (eg. EU-SADC meeting moved from Copehagen to Maputo, Ell-Africa summit postponed sine die, ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels cancelled, disagreements over the France-Africa summit, meetings on NEPAD, etc). 
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Filippo Saracco, European Commission 
ultimately towards sanctions 
on the other. This might be 
done by, among other things: 
• Developing a more wide-
spread understanding of 
how these provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement can be 
used. 
• Seeking to give Article 8 an 
"ordinary and run of the 
mill" image by choosing 
non-controversial subjects to 
start with and by making 
sure the dialogue goes on 
continuously on a regular 
basis; 
• Choosing low-key informal approaches by agreeing to min-
imise formal diplomatic protocol; 
• Having several Ajrticle 8 dialogue streams on different subjects 
going on in parallel and using a variety of formulae; 
• Using a variety of types of session, some closed, some open and 
different participants for each subject. 
2. Pay attention to process, as it is usually the way a dialogue 
is run that makes participants more or less at ease and more or 
less willing to contribute actively and constructively: 
• Dialogue should be two-way and not just set by the EU's 
agenda, but also by the ACP country's agenda. The EU 
should be prepared to discuss its policies in general and not 
just those specifically oriented towards the country con-
cerned: eg, the question of coherence in EU policies (cf. spe-
cific reference to this in Article 12) should be of clear interest 
to the ACP; 
• Make sure expectations on both sides are well understood; 
• Each side should be seen clearly to be making an effort to 
respond to the expectations of the other side; 
• Ensure views of both sides are listened to properly; 
• Identify representatives to lead the dialogue who are, as much 
as possible, trusted on both sides - make sure they always 
have an overview; 
• Consider using independent/neutral facilitators particularly 
for subjects that are even a bit sensitive; 
• Do not expect to rush discussions; 
• Be prepared to be flexible. 
Above all, Article 8 should not be used for resolving crises. 
Article 96 serves that purpose. The key to success with 
Cotonou's Article 8 may well be precisely in knowing when not 
to use it. The prime objective of Article 8 is to foster mutual 
understanding. This should remain its principle goal in practice 
also. When major disagreements emerge or if one parry refuses 
to discuss a topic which the other sees as vital, then the discus-
sion is perhaps best transferred quickly to another forum (eg, 
closed door discussions followed by Article 96 action) outside 
the established Article 8 framework. 
Camp near Bunia, RDC. 
Article 1/1 of the Cotonou Agreement provides 
r dialogue on peace-building policies, 
conflict prevention and resolutie 
Conclusion 
As its title suggests, partnership in development cooperation is 
a central guiding principle for the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement. One key method foreseen for putting this concept 
into practice was the inclusion of provisions for political dialogue 
in the Agreement. Unfortunately this is not yet working as well 
as had been hoped, and there is a sense that expectations in some 
quarters were perhaps a bit too high. 
The negotiators may have agreed the principles, but in practice 
this has proved a very difficult area to implement. The signing of a 
general agreement to dialogue does not automatically mean that 
every official involved will be willing to do so in any specific set of 
circumstances. On the EU side in particular, it should be recognised 
that if the EU sees Article 8 largely as a convenient way of tackling 
awkward subjects and resolving differences with individual ACP 
governments and focuses its political dialogue efforts on such sensi-
tive subjects, then it becomes very easy to slip into what some in the 
ACP see as interference. The partnership is manifestly not one of 
equals and this imposes certain limitations which should be recog-
nised. The EU holds most of the major cards. The ACP feel this 
means the EU can twist their arm if differences are not resolved. 
Of course awkward subjects — inter-alia the essential elements 
- do need to be discussed and judgement will have to be made 
from time to time. Dialogue is clearly also the way forward to 
resolve differences and not only to foster mutual understanding, 
but with sensitive subjects it has to be handled carefully and there 
can be no expectation of automaticity. For the "health" of Article 
8 political dialogue, the emphasis should therefore be primarily 
on the fostering of mutual understanding in a wide variety of 
areas (and not just on the essential elements) and the resolution 
of crises in relations should be left to Article 96 consultations. 
Wisdom, care and some restraint in choosing what to discuss, 
when and how is also a mark of a mature partnership. ■ 
* Programme Coordinator at ECDPM responsible for its work on the political dimensions 
theme. ECDPM is an independent foundation based in the Nl. and dedicated to capaci-
ty building activities focused on strengthening ACP-EU cooperation: www.ccdpm.org. 
1. An earlier version of this article was presented to the BOND/EADI Conference on "Europe 
initie World: EU External Relations & Development', »russels 19 May 20O3Thc author 
would like to thank the conference organisers and participants, colleagues at ECDPM for 
their useful comments and suggestions and various ACP and ED officials for their willing-
ness to discuss their work on the political dialogue provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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dance in 
Africa: 
a revolution 
in full swing! 
Savog company  ©Antoine Tempe 
Of all the forms of artistic expression, dance is perhaps the closest to the essence of 
universal communication, pure and simple. Body language transcends all differences -
and cannot lie! This is demonstrated by a new generation of dancers/choreographers 
whenever they have the opportunity. Like in Dakar, in June this year, at the second 
Kaay Fece ("Come and dance") international dance festival. 
Bernard Verschueren 
What a celebration it was! But opportunities to 
discover such a proliferation of talent on the African stage 
are still too few and far between. A phenomenon in full 
swing, choreographic art in French-speaking Africa is 
there to be discovered at events such as "Kaay Fece" 
(Dakar), "Dialogues de Corps" (Ouagadougou), "Atout 
Africain" (Ouidah) and the "Rencontres chorégraphiques 
dAntananarivo" (organised by the French Association for 
Artistic Action). Alongside the many traditional troupes 
and national ballets surviving here and there, Africa is wit-
nessing the emergence of a young generation of creators, 
unencumbered by tradition and gradually shaking off the 
almost obligatory post-independence assertion of identity, 
who are now exploring the world of choreographic research 
and creation with polished acumen, assured technical skill 
and undeniable inventiveness. 
Eclectic mix 
Nganti Towo, a dancer from Cameroon, is the main-
spring of this initiative. He refutes the label "contempo-
rary" because "it's a concept deriving from a Western per-
spective. Since the very beginning of dance, there has 
always been contemporary dance, i.e. dance of the moment 
as opposed to that of the past". To confuse the issue further, 
Kaay Fece advertises itself first and foremost as a "festival of 
all dances"; Mandingue, Afro-American, Serere, Austrian, 
Casamançais, Italo-Belgian, Ghanaian, Germano-Togolese, 
Congolese, Burkinabé, Cape Verdian, etc. In Dakar, the 
stage was alive with striking contrasts at the prestigious 
Daniel Sorano National Theatre, the Douta Seek Arts 
Centre and the French Cultural Centre, where demonstra-
tions of ancestral rituals rubbed shoulders with innovative 
modern methods. 
More than just an event, Kaay Fece sees itself as an 
"instrument for the development, recognition and profes-
sionalisation of dance". Created in 2000, the Kaay Fece 
association works to raise awareness and provide profession-
al training throughout the year. It is also involved in dance 
initiatives for the benefit of young disabled people and trad-
itional dance workshops in Senegalese schools. The first 
Kaay Fece festival, in 2001, was a complete gamble, an 
impulsive act, with makeshift technical and hospitality facil-
ities and the artists performing virtually for free. Through a 
combination of persistence and ingenuity, and after months 
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of relentless, repeated efforts to build up (sometimes unusu-
al) partnerships, the organising team managed to scrape 
together most of the provisional budget fot the 2003 event 
(around a hundred million CFA francs, almost €200.000). 
One of the major donors was Senegal itself, with a substan-
tial contribution from Dakar urban council. 
Showcase for dance for all 
The result was a professional event involving 31 compa-
nies from very different origins who do not normally work 
for free, and boasting a technical director, a structured and 
diverse programme, decent hospitality facilities, and real 
works of art on the stage. To guarantee the popular dimen-
sion so important to its organisers and to give everyone the 
chance to discover this anthology of dance, the festival was 
entirely free and for eight days the streets of Dakar were a 
hive of activity as, under the rapturous gaze of residents, 
traditional dance groups performed a simb (fake lion game) 
or a lively sabar (a traditional festive dance). Teaching and 
demonstration workshops were open to all, with choreog-
raphers sharing their expertise, rounding off this interna-
tional dance festival. 
Kaay Fece also provided a rare opportunity for profes-
sionals to meet and share experiences with, and compete 
against, other professionals who had come with their com-
panies or those who had decided to make the journey to 
Dakar, like Salia Sanou or Faustin Linyekula. There were 
authors who had come for the purpose of looking around 
and immersing themselves in their brothers' creative spirit; 
rather than seeking a gateway to the West, which may 
appear to be the Holy Grail but is often not a solution... 
Artistic creation par excellence 
The programme of events highlighted the vitality of 
artistic creation, particularly in Senegal, also home to the 
"Ecole des Sables", located in the village of Toubab 
Dialaw. Founded in 1998 by Germaine Acogny, this 
school takes in over 20 dancers and choreographers every 
year. Many of the promising young talents of today were 
trained here, by professionals from all regions of the con-
tinent. The school also witnessed the creation of part of "O 
More" by Barnardo Montet, a choreographer of Guyanese-
Vietnamese origin, which was the festival's opening per-
formance. Loosely based on Shakespeare's Othello, it was a 
powerful reflection on the issues of mixed race, identity 
and memory, performed in the manner of a trance by six 
dancers from Africa and beyond, accompanied from start 
to finish by Gnawa musicians from Morocco. A symbolic 
figure of modern Senegalese choreography, Jean Tamba 
and his company 5ème Dimension presented "Bujtiman". 
Intetpteted by four veteran dancers, including the extraor-
dinary Simone Gomis, against a highly coloutful visual 
background and an eccentric audio accompaniment, 
Bujuman depicts the daily struggle faced by the hundreds 
of down-and-outs living in modern African cities. For 
some, the real revelation was young (28-year-old) 
Congolese Andréya Ouamba, choreographer for the com-
pany 1er Temps in Dakar. Four waiting solitary figures 
became intertwined in controlled, graceful body move-
ments, remarkably interpreted by young dancers, one of 
whom was Dakar's talented star, Fatou Cissé. 
Young artistic creation was not overshadowed, with the 
public having a whofe afternoon to discover some bud-
ding talents, aged 6-16, who embody the infatuation with 
modern dance of a young generation with something to 
say, like Bertrand Tchébé Saky's "Etincelles", which 
brought its audience face to face with the reality of street 
children, delivering a beautiful message of hope. The most 
intense mixed perspective came from the Savog company; 
the story, in life as on stage, of a meeting between Togolese 
Pierre Sanouvi and dancer Annette Vogel from Munich. 
A truly international crossroads of dance, Kaay Fece 
also played host to the Ta company from Burkina Faso, 
which performed "Bûudu ou le songe d'un peuple", 
focusing on myths, customs, rites and a way of life falling 
victim to relentless change. The young, friendly group 
from Cape Verde's Raiz di Polon company enlivened the 
festival by its presence everywhere. On the stage at the 
Sorano Theatre they performed "Duas Sem Três", a duet 
laced with humour playing homage to women, and "CV 
Matrix 25" on the theme of exile, musically portrayed by 
an outstanding singer and guitarist who transported the 
audience to the islands with her swaying morna. The 
artists of Ghana's Dance Factory offered a spectacle with 
mixed influences raising awareness of AIDS, one of the 
themes of the festival. The visual tapestry was enriched by 
companies from the US, Austria, Belgium and France, 
who came to show off their creations to a Dakar audience 
never shy of expressing its opinion. Here and there, a 
strong contingent of friends and supporters of tradition-
al troupes from the four corners of Senegal gave the 
crowd a multi-hued appearance and created an atmos-
phere that often more closely resembled a sports field 
than a silent, Western-style place of cultural diffusion. 
Indeed, this meeting between the expression of tradition 
and artistic creation drawn from inexhaustible roots, a 
modern, often urban Africa, and a universal choreo-
graphic heritage, yielded the emotion, surprise and magic 
perceptible throughout Kaay Fece 2003. ■ 
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Cook Islands 
Aerial view of Rarotonga 
Located approximately 3,500 km north-east of New Zealand in the South Pacific Ocean, the Cook 
Islands comprises 15 islands, scattered over more than two million square kilometres and divided 
into two groups: the southern group, which includes Rarotonga (the main island), Aitutaki, Atiu, 
Mangaia, Mauke, Mitiaro, Manuae, Palmerston, Takutea, and the northern group, which includes 
Manihiki, Nassau, Penrhyn, Pukapuka, Rakahanga and Suwarrow. 
The Cook Islands is a self-governing state in free association with New Zealand: while exercising full 
executive and legislative powers, its citizens hold New Zealand citizenship and have free access to 
New Zealand. In 2000, it joined the ACP-EU partnership, along with five other Pacific states. 
The Cook Islands has long depended on agriculture and subsistence fishing, but today tourism is the 
leading sector in the economy: the Cook Islands has some of the most beautiful and diverse scenery 
in the South Pacific, from turquoise waters and white sandy beaches to rugged volcanic peaks. The 
rapid expansion of the black pearl industry and the launching of the tuna industry have recently 
provided new employment opportunities for the local population. 
Although the main island is relatively developed, the outer islands still lag behind. The government 
is trying to address these disparities, which are one of the main causes of the migration of a large 
number of people, including skilled and qualified labour. To this end, the assistance provided by the 
European Union aims to improve social services (health and education) in the outer islands, thus 
contributing to the future growth prospects of the country, hoping to lure back some of those who 
have migrated in the past decade. 
Report by Maurizio Carbone 
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A unique status 
in international politics 
The Cook Islands enjoys a special status ¡n the international arena: self-governing in free 
association with New Zealand. As a consequence of this unique relationship, Cook 
Islanders are citizens of New Zealand and have the right to emigrate at will to both New 
Zealand and Australia. The emigration of skilled workers and the big government deficit 
are two of the key challenges that Cook Islands faces at the moment. 
Believed to be inhabited already in 800 AD, settled 
from nearby islands in the thirteenth century, visited by 
European navigators at the end of the sixteenth century, the 
Cook Islands takes its name from Captain James Cook, 
who, between 1773 and 1777, landed at a number of the 
islands that today bear his name. A new phase began in July 
1823 with the arrival of representatives of the London 
Missionary Society, who brought Christianity and drew up 
legal codes which led to political stability. In 1888, it was 
declared a British protectorate, with the Southern group 
named Hervey Islands and the islands of the Northern 
group named individually. 
Free association with New Zealand 
In 1901 Cook Islands was annexed by New Zealand and 
administered as a dependent territory until 1965 when, fol-
lowing an act of self-determination, it became self-govern-
ing in free association with New Zealand. From constitu-
tion day (4 August 1965), the New Zealand Parliament, 
unless requested, ceased to have power to make laws in 
respect of the Cook Islands, and from 1981, it was absolute-
ly precluded from legislating for the Cook Islands, even with 
the request and consent of the Cook Islands Parliament. 
Over the years, the Cook Islands has taken over progres-
sively more responsibility from New Zealand, generally as a 
result of harmonious negotiations. In 1973, the Prime 
Ministet of New Zealand and the Premier of Cook Islands 
clarified some aspects of this relationship in an exchange of 
letters: there were no legal restrainrs on the freedom of the 
Cook Islands, but New Zealand remained responsible for 
foreign affairs and defence, in consultation with the Cook 
Islands government. In 2001, to mark the centenary of the 
formal association between the two countries, a joint decla-
ration updated the relationship, with the Cook Islands seek-
ing and achieving increasing autonomy with respect to for-
eign and defence affairs. Helen Clark, Premier of New 
Zealand declared that "if people in the Cook Islands want 
to assert their independence, New Zealand will not stand in 
their way", but also noted that if the Cook Islands wanted 
to become a member of the United Nations, the special rela-
tionship with New Zealand should be rethought. 
Nevertheless, at the moment Cook Islands is a member of 
the Pacific Islands Forum and of a number of international 
organisations (i.e. FAO, WHO, UNESCO); it has also 
established a number of diplomatic relationships with third 
countries. 
Population decline 
In a recent poll on whether the Cook Islands should 
become independent, a large majority voted against it, thus 
opting to keep the status quo. Cook Islanders, as they are 
citizens of New Zealand, can reside, work and enjoy social _country report: Cook Islands 
The Saturday morning outdoor market is an occasion to buy a variety of 
islands produce, but also different kinds of crafts and souvenirs. 
benefits in New Zealand and as a result of the Trans-Tasman 
relationship between New Zealand and Australia, enjoy the 
same benefits in Australia. No politician could even think of 
pursuing independence at the cost of jeopardising the New 
Zealand citizenship. 
This open access to both Australia and New Zealand has 
major implications for migration patterns: according to the 
latest census (2001), the resident population is about 
13,400, while 80,000 Cook Islanders live abroad, mainly in 
New Zealand. A major disadvantage of the population 
decline, patticularly in the outer islands, is the loss of skilled 
and qualified workers; this drain is continuing and has a 
negative impact on the growth of the private sector. The 
hope is that the recent boom in tourism and pearls may 
attract some Cook Islanders back, although the government 
has dropped a campaign to lure islanders home. 
Asked why Cook Islanders migrate, Professor Crocombe, 
a major expert on Pacific issues living in Rarotonga, gives 
several possible explanations: "In addition to the fact that 
generally people in small places are attracted to larger places, 
I see three more reasons. First of all, excessive and inefficient 
government which absorbs too much of the available 
income, sets a low productivity model, and keeps the 
incomes of Cook Islanders much lower than they need to 
be. Second, the fact that communications, shipping, air-
lines, most merchandising and a number of other activities 
are controlled by a small cartel of mainly expatriate busi-
nessmen who keep prices excessive and the cost of living too 
high. Third, the higher pay, wider range of services, and 
availability of unemployment and other welfare payments in 
New Zealand and Australia, to both of which Cook 
Islanders have free access." 
A two-party system 
Post-independence politics has been dominated by two 
major parties: the Cook Islands Party (CIP) and the 
Democratic Party (DP), which has split into the Democratic 
Alliance Party (DAP) and the New Alliance Party (NAP). 
The CIP has been under the leadership of Albert Henry for 
a long time, and the DP under the leadership of Sir Tomas 
Davis. After ruling the country since independence, Albert 
Henry was removed from Parliament in 1978 by the High 
Court on the grounds of electoral corruption. The Henry 
government had also little understanding of economics, 
expanding inefficient services, while at the same time pro-
ductivity in key economic sectots declined shatply. 
Albert Henry's successor, Dr Tom Davies, a Cook Islander 
who spent most of his life in New Zealand and the US, came 
to power trying to restructure the economy: exports doubled, 
efficiency increased, nepotism and political favouritism were 
reduced. His government lasted nine years before being ousted 
by a vote of no confidence by his own party. Following the 
1989 elections, Sir Geoffrey Henry, cousin of Alben, and new 
leader of the CIP, remained in power for about a decade. The 
new government continued the ptactises used before 1978: 
new jobs were created for political supporters, but to cope with 
the financial crisis of the mid 1990s, in 1996 over 60 per cent 
of public services had to be dismissed. 
Patronage, party switches by members of Parliament, and 
cabinet reshuffles are a major concern: politicians are increas-
ingly the target of peoples criticism. For instance, over the 
past five years, the Cook Islands has gone through five coali-
tion governments, which has inhibited consistency in eco-
nomic and financial policies. The current government, led 
by Prime Minister Dr Robert Woonton, has been in place 
since January 2003 following the reunification of the 
Democratic Party. 
The offshore industry 
Another major challenge comes from the offshore indus-
try. Created in the early 1980s, the offshore finance business 
has grown to occupy an important role in the local econo-
my in terms of direct value added (wages and profits), 
license fees and taxes and a range of indirect effects; it has 
also proved to be an important source of employment for 
qualified people. According to Brent Weenink, President of 
the Trustee Companies Association, "the scale of offshote 
business activity associated with the Cook Islands is esti-
mated to be substantial, largely because of the asset protec-
tion trust. Company registrations are in decline. The num-
ber of offshore banks and insurance companies is also min-
imal. For the past ten years, the finance and business sector 
(which includes offshore business) has grown at an imptes-
sive annual average of six per cent". 
If on the one hand this sector has grown at a steady rate, 
on the other hand major concerns have been raised about 
the fact that the Cook Islands is included on the OECD 
Financial Action Task Force (FATP) list as failing to cooper-
ate with international efforts to combat money laundering. 
The Cook Islands made a commitment to improve the 
transparency of its tax and regulatory systems and establish 
effective exchange of infotmation for tax matters with 
OECD countries by the end of 2005. 
The Cook Islands Offshore Banking Commissioner, 
Matilda Uhrle, says that "new legislation has been drafted to 
strengthen the country's anti-money laundering law. The 
new banking act is in line with current international stan-
dards on banking supervision and regulation". A new 
Financial Supervisory Commission was established in July 
2003 to license and regulate all trustee companies and banks 
providing domestic and international trustee and banking 
services in or from the Cook Islands. The enactment of this 
comprehensive framework shows clearly that the govern-
ment is fully committed to meeting FATF requirements for 
the country's removal from the blacklist: the issue is now the 
degree to which the new laws are implemented. ■ MC 
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Beyond tourism: 
manne resources as potential for further 
economic growth 
For many years, tourism was the only productive sector in the Cook Islands. In 
recent years, the black pearl industry and the launching of the fish industry 
have increased the economic opportunities for citizens; furthermore, renewed 
interest in mining in the ocean may represent a major source of potential 
economic growth in the long term. 
During 1 982-1 994, the real per capita gross domes-
tic product (GDP) of the Cook Islands grew at an aver-
age annual rate of 3.5 per cent. Tourism, but also a pub-
lic sector which relied on foreign aid and foreign bor-
rowings, were the engines for growth. During the fol-
lowing years (1995-1998) contractions in tourism and 
cuts in the public sector led to a severe financial crisis: 
real GDP fell from 4.4 per cent in 1995 to 0.2 per cent 
in 1998. Government debt reached unsustainable levels. 
As the situation worsened, an Economic Restructuring 
Programme was implemented to reduce substantially the 
size of the public service, improve fiscal governance, and 
facilitate private sector development. 
Between 1996 and 1998 the number of public ser-
vants was reduced by 57 per cent. The social conse-
quence of this retrenchment was that about 18 per cent 
of the population migtated to New Zealand. From 1999 
the economy started to recover, mainly as a result not 
only of tourism but also of black pearl production. To 
these activities, we can now add the launching of the 
fishing industry and, in the longer term, the possible 
exploitation of mineral resources. 
Tourism 
Until the early 1970s the Cook Islands was an isolat-
ed destination in the Pacific; its economy was based 
mainly on agriculture and fishing. The opening of the 
international airport in Rarotonga in 1974 completely 
changed this pictute, making tourism the leading sec-
tor in the economy. Visitor arrivals increased by a very 
high percentage and so did the availability of accom-
modation. 
With this growth, some concerns have emerged. The 
first concern is with connectivity: tourism depends most-
ly on only one international carrier: Air New Zealand. 
Local people also complain about the high price of air-
plane tickets. Recently, two other carriers (Aloha and 
Royal Tongan) have started operating some weekly flights: 
this has led to more opportunities for tourism arrivals and 
to a drop in prices (including those of Air New Zealand). 
The second concern is about further development in 
this sector: the existing accommodation in Rarotonga is 
often overbooked. The strategy now is to expand the 
tourist offer to the other islands. "If until five years ago, 
tourism was not an issue for the outer islands, now peo-
ple are coming to us asking for more tourist opportuni-
ties", says Chris Wong, Chief Executive Officer of the 
Cook Islands Tourism Corporation (CITC). 
In this sense, Air Rarotonga, the domestic airline, rep-
resents the most important partner: "Aitutaki is now get-
ting more tourists. I think we can do more for islands 
like Atiu and Mangaia. But we don't only need more 
flights; we also need some serious investment, in terms 
of better infrastructures and better services offered to the 
tourists", explains Ewan Smith, managing Director and 
also chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce. 
Along the same lines, Mr Wong argues that "tourism 
is not only about accommodation. We also need to have-
more support services. For instance, tourists sometimes 
complain that there are not many activities, distractions, 
Aryk Moore 
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possibilities to buy souvenirs. We need to place more 
emphasis on this. We need to do some solid research 
about what people want when they come here. But we 
should also keep in mind that we are different from 
other countries. Handicrafts in other places can be pro-
duced very cheaply because labour is cheap. In the Cook 
Islands, labour is not that cheap. An option that is now 
being pursued is more sophisticated arts". 
Another major concern is about the effect of tourist 
growth on the environment and the pressure on natural 
resources. For instance, the issue of waste management: 
if in Rarotonga they are already overloaded, Aitutaki has 
no formal waste management facilities. In addition, bet-
ter provision of power and water is necessary. "We 
should be very cautious about further expansion. I think 
we should look at improving the quality of the services 
we offer. Also, to make this industry sustainable we must 
make sure that local people participate fully in this 
growth: if the host is not happy, the visitor will not be 
happy", concludes Mr Wong. 
Black pearl industry 
The development of the black pearl industry is fairly 
recent, but has rapidly become the leading sector in 
export earnings and the second in importance (after 
tourism) for the nation's economy. The vast majority 
(about 90 per cent) of world black pearl production 
comes from French Polynesia, while Cook Islands pro-
duces less than 10 per cent. 
Most of Cook Islands' exports go partly to Japan 
(50 per cent) and partly to Europe, New Zealand, 
Australia and the US. Almost all farming activity occurs 
in Manihiki, where the growth of the pearl industry has 
contributed to the development of the telecommunica-
tions, transport and health sectors. Because of this suc-
cess, the government has been encouraging other islands 
to follow suit. "Furthet development in Manihiki is not 
possible. Penrhyn has a lot of room for expansion: at the 
moment, they are using only 10 per cent of their 
lagoons. Something can also be done in Palmerston", 
says Ian Bertram, director of Aquaculture and Inshore 
Fisheries at the Ministry of Marine Resources. 
However, such optimism should be tempered with con-
cern regarding potential environmental degtadation. If 
lagoons are overcrowded, they ate likely to produce 
unhealthy pearl oysters, as was the case for Manihiki in 2000, 
where the poor quality of the water spread bacteria to almost 
all farms, ultimately causing a severe disease outbreak. 
Better management practises and sound husbandry are 
thus needed to minimise the likelihood of an epidemic. 
A management plan which could define stocking rates, 
locations, and husbandry rates has always been called 
for, but the lack of cohesiveness in the sector has for a 
long time prevented the Ministry for Marine Resources 
from intervening: "We have just finished a management 
plan and we are ready to submit it to the local commu-
nities. This is not an easy process because some farmers 
will be asked to cut their production. Rather than vol-
ume, I think more emphasis should be put on quality", 
says Mr Bertram. 
A similar opinion is expressed by Temu Okotai, owner 
of Direct Pearl Farm: "The emphasis is still too much on 
production. This was a very lucrative sector until three 
years ago, when world prices were still high: we did not 
need to bother about marketing. There is also a need for 
an agency to help small farmers to negotiate with the 
buyers: small farmers are often at the mercy of big buy-
ers. We need more discipline: we can't just go ahead the 
way we are doing now. The government seems to be very 
receptive. We need their help in the area of marketing, 
quality control, management of lagoons and farming 
practices." 
The organisational structure of this sector is rather 
weak. The Pearl Federation represents the farmers, while 
the Peatl Guild represents the retailers. A Pearl 
Authority, which was meant to be the regulatory body of 
the industry, was established in 1994 but, as it did not 
get strong farmer support, it was shut down in 1996. 
"Farmers said they did not need an authority. They did 
not want to work together. They just wanted to produce 
pearls, and at that time they sold them at a very good 
price. Now the situation has changed: prices have 
dropped, farms are overcrowded. Farmers are continu-
ously asking government to do something. As for the 
Guild, farmers do not like them very much not only 
because they are an exclusive group, but also because 
they have been accused of importing pearls from Tahiti 
to be sold to tourists. We make a lot of efforts to make 
people come here, so why should they come here and 
buyTahitian pearls?", wonders Mr Okatai. 
"We do not import pearls that are already farmed in 
the Cook Islands. The real problem is low quality pearls, 
sold in the local market: this damages the image of the 
entire sector. Consumers are protected by the standards 
we set. All members of the Guild advise customers and 
issue certificates that guarantee quality", says Raymond 
Newnham, Chairman of the Pearl Guild. 
A final constraint for the sector is the dependence on 
foreign technicians, who come mainly from Japan, and 
lately also from China. Technicians are very expensive: 
they are usually paid by owning a part of the oysters they 
seed (about 40 per cent); in rare cases, they are paid a flat 
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fee per oyster seeded. Training of local technicians and 
farmers is thus required to improve farm returns and 
farmer ability to monitor and control sales. 
Fishing industry 
The Cook Islands Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
covers an area of 1.8 million km
2 and shares common 
borders with five other Pacific Island nations or territo-
ries. The Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery is the 
largest tuna fishery in the world. 
However, for the past decades the Cook Islands has 
relied only on revenue coming from selling fishing 
licenses to foreign fleets (i.e. Japanese, Korean and 
Taiwanese vessels), and by signing bilateral treaties with 
foreign countries: for example, one of these treaties 
allowed US vessels to access the Cook Islands EEZ as 
part of an arrangement between the US and several 
Pacific Island countries. Nevertheless, US vessels did not 
take full advantage of this special arrangement. 
Some local or locally based vessels were licensed 
between 1994 and 1997, but in the past two years the 
situation has drastically changed. "We decided to close 
the zone to foreign fishing and, as a result, the number 
of local people investing in this sector has increased: 
now we have a sizeable amount of locally based vessels. 
At the moment there are no particular schemes set up 
to help fishing vessels, but the government has sent a 
clear message to the lending institutions that it fully 
supports and wants to develop this industry. This 
degree of confidence is the basis for banks to lend 
money to fishers at good rates", says Joshua Mitchell, 
director of offshore fisheries at the Ministry for Marine 
Resources. 
There are two different fishing approaches practised in 
the Cook Islands: in the Southern group, the targets are 
high value tuna for overseas markets, primarily Japan 
and the US; by-catch from these vessels is sold on the 
local market. In the Northern group, the fish caught is 
used for canneries in American Samoa. "For a long time 
people were convinced that the fishing sector was not 
economically viable. In December 2001, embarrassing 
to admit, we were importing tuna from Fiji. In March 
2002, we started exporting for the first time in our his-
tory. This highlights how fast the sector has changed. 
The industry is growing so quickly that the government 
is even experiencing some problems in keeping up with 
the pace. What we need now is a better system to con-
trol and manage this industry, in terms of export certifi-
cation, quality control, customs and tax issues, spe-
cialised workers coming from abroad. Another challenge 
concerns illegal fishing: the government patrol is joined 
by New Zealand and French forces, but the area is very 
big and resources to control the zone are limited", 
explains Navy Epati, secretary at the Minister for Marine 
Resources. 
Mining 
Since the early 1990s, mining has been an area of 
increasing interest, but no substantial progress has yet 
been made. Some pre-feasibility studies have been 
Recent data show that exports of fish amounted to €1.2 million in 2002 compared 
with negligible figures in prior years and are expected to grow even more. 
A clear sign of the development of the fishing industry is the project to enlarge 
the country's largest harbour at Avatiu, Rarotonga, which was prompted by the 
rapid increase in the number of fishing boats based at the port. 
conducted and although mining is unlikely to produce 
significant results in the short term, the impact in the 
long term may be substantial. The most abundant ele-
ment is manganese nodules, found on the seabed, which 
are formed by metallic elements that slowly precipitate 
out of the ocean water. 
Cobalt is the most valuable metal in these nodules. It 
is used in several industrial applications, mostly by the 
aircraft industry, but lately also for rechargeable batteries 
for portable computers and other applications. World 
consumption of cobalt is about 30,000 tonnes per year; 
at this level, according to an Asian Development Bank 
study, Cook Islands cobalt could meet total world 
demand for more than 300 years. 
Even though the potential value of mining is large 
(more than NZ $2 trillion [€1 trillion] only for cobalt), 
the cost of sea-bed mining is very high, as nodules occur 
in very deep waters (5,000 metres). Several attempts 
have been made to explore mining methods applicable 
to these depths by different nations with little success. 
Furthermore, it would also be necessary to consider the 
negative environmental consequences of mining, as nod-
ule collection could have a severe impact on the seafloor 
ecosystem. ■ MC 
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Political and economic reforms through 
popular consultation: 
the view from government 
Dr Robert Woonton is Prime Minister of the Cook Islands. Since taking power in 
February 2002 he has introduced a series of well-received economic and political 
reforms, thanks also to the involvement of citizens and civil society. His ultimate aim 
is to reduce the disparities between the main and the outer islands, which would 
also help to encourage the return of people who have migrated in the past decade. 
In 2001 the Cook Islands 
celebrated 100 years of the 
relationship with New Zealand. 
How has this relationship 
evolved over the years? 
The centennial celebration has 
been an occasion to clarify our posi-
tion. When we became independent 
in 1965 we did not have the capacity 
to look after foreign and defence pol-
icy issues; therefore we left those 
areas to New Zealand. As the years 
went by, we evolved, our national 
identity developed, and we became 
more and more independent. Now 
we are a sovereign nation in all 
aspects. It is obvious that we value 
our friendship with New Zealand: we 
share the same citizenship, the same 
currency, but this does not mean that New Zealand has 
any political or legal control over the Cook Islands. We 
consult each other very often, but at the end we decide 
ourselves. 
The Cook Islands has been accused of a lack of 
transparency in its banking operations. Are you 
making any progress towards being de-listed 
from the OECD blacklist on money laundering? 
Yes, we have made significant changes in the man-
agement of our finances. We are now more transparent. 
We recently passed a set of legislative measures to pro-
tect the financial dealings of the country. We have set 
the framework on how to supervise financial transac-
tions, set up a supervisory commission that requires 
that any transaction must make available where it orig-
inated, the amount, and where it is going. An IMF del-
egation came early this year. An agency has been set up 
to provide for more transparent financial management. 
It is true that we ate still on the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATP) blacklist as having laws that are not 
friendly to an open and transparent banking system, 
but the government is fully committed to complying 
with the requirements imposed by the international 
community. We fully support the United Nations reso-
lution against countries that encourage money launder-
ing for terrorism activities. 
Tourism, black pearls and 
fishing are the three major 
income-generating sources in 
the Cook Islands. What is the 
order of priorities for your 
government to create more 
employment opportunities? 
There is no doubt that tourism is the 
main growth engine. The impact of 
terrorism and the outbreak of SARS 
were not as bad as we had foreseen. But 
like any other tourist-based economy, 
we have to consider whether our infra-
structures are able to carry a large vol-
ume of tourists. For this reason, rather 
than concentrating only on one island, 
we are trying to expand the tourist 
offer to the outer islands, which do not 
have the same economic opportunities 
that the main island enjoys. However, we still need more 
investment to modernise airport infrastructures and other 
tourist-related facilities. 
The pearl market is experiencing some negative trends, 
especially in prices, which we cannot control. Still, we can 
do more in marketing our pearls in global markets. 
As for fishing, we have just revived the tuna industry. 
For quite a number of years, we did not focus on devel-
oping our own resources; we just relied on issuing fishing 
licenses. In the past two years we have decided to invest 
heavily in this sector. The private sector has responded 
well. We have now become exporters, but the next step is 
to move from only exporting to also processing. 
Government instability has dominated political 
life in the past five years, creating disaffection 
towards politics among citizens. What are the 
reasons for this instability? 
The reasons must be looked for in the political system in 
general. First of all there is an imbalance of representation 
of people in Parliament. As a consequence of the crisis in 
the late 1980s many people left the country. This has cre-
ated some contradictions in the system: an island with 700 
people appoints one member in Parliament, another island 
with 600 people appoints two members, and another 
island with 700 people appoints three members. 
We need structural reforms. A few years ago a commission 
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of experts made some recommendations, such as reducing 
the term of Parliament, and the number of seats. The 
Parliament has also recently voted to drop the country's 
"overseas seat". All these reforms are adopted by actively 
consulting the stakeholders in development: we strongly 
encouraged active interaction between government and 
civil society. We consult civil society and NGOs on almost 
all issues. 
Isn't dropping the "overseas seat" a sign of a 
negative attitude towards people who have 
migrated? 
What system allows citizens who have left their coun-
try to continue voting? There must be a time after which 
people no longer enjoy their right to vote. Our attitude 
towards people who migrated is not negative. We are 
trying to attract them and the best way to reach this goal 
is by creating economic opportunities in the outer 
islands, because it is from there that most people migrat-
ed. But we also want to improve the infrastructural sys-
tem, such as airports, streets, schools, and hospitals, so 
that if and when they come back they will be able to 
enjoy the same quality of life they enjoyed abroad. 
How are international donors responding to 
your attempts to improve living conditions in 
the Cook Islands? 
As I said before, our relationship with New Zealand 
is very close and they have provided a lot of 
assistance. But 
now we are also 
proud to be part of 
the Cotonou 
Agreement. The 
EU assistance is 
certainly a good 
thing for outer 
island develop-
ment, but we also 
look for benefits in 
terms of better 
market access, 
trade and invest-
ment opportuni-
ties. We are look-
ing for some assis-
tance in develop-
ing what we have. 
Besides fish and 
pearls, you would 
be surprised to 
know that there is 
a wealth of miner-
Cook Islands and the Caribbean country 
of Jamaica signed an agreement in May 
establishing diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. Even 
though the two countries are far apart, 
they often face similar challenges. The 
signing took place during a dual 
ceremony in Brussels in May, when 
Cook Islands also signed the 
Georgetown Agreement, formally 
becoming a member of the ACP Grou 
als in our ocean 
that still need to be exploited. Finally, we have and we 
will continue to benefit from the regional coopera-
tion programmes that the EU is developing in the 
Pacific Islands region. ■ MC 
ip. 
The best government is the least government: 
the view from the opposition 
After being in power for more than a decade, Sir Geoffrey Henry is now the leader 
of the opposition. In this interview, he discusses some of the major achievements 
of his previous governments, while at the same time he analyses the major 
differences between his political programme and that of the current government. 
Your party was ousted from 
government in one of the 
many changes of coalitions 
during the current legislature. 
Do you agree that the system 
needs to go through some 
structural changes? 
Instability has nothing to do with 
our constitution or the electoral law. 
The problem is not the structure of 
our system, but the people elected as 
politicians. When I set up a commis-
sion to review our political structure, 
I wanted it to present some practical 
recommendations about a more 
appropriate structure for our size, 
spending power and culture. I wanted 
it to be an exercise done by Cook 
Islanders themselves rather than by 
foreign experts, as was the case for the 
Constitution. What they propose is 
fine, but I wanted something which 
looked at different issues, such as how 
the Parliament fits in our society, sep-
aration of powers schemes, the ques-
tion of voting as opposed to consen-
sus which is typical of a Polynesian 
society. 
Your reading of the political 
system is quite different from 
that of the current 
government... 
We are reform-oriented, while the 
current government is not. We are 
not philosophical people in the 
n°200 september-october 2003 the Courier ACP-EU (43) _country report: Cook Islands 
sense that we follow any kind of "ism". Ideology does 
not play a role in our approach, and more generally in 
Cook Islands politics. Our policies are determined by 
the practical needs of this country. For instance, we 
started a whole reform programme which completely 
changed the management of finances in this country. 
We reformed the public service, so that people became 
civil servants based on merit rather than patronage. We 
also made several changes to the Constitution to re-
inforce tough policing of the State's financial manage-
ment. Many people in the current government believe 
in the old idea of big government, where the govern-
ment does everything, interfering in the private sector, 
and deciding who gets a job. 
What is your approach to economic issues? 
We are strong supporters of the private sector, which is 
the engine of growth. The current government is luke-
warm on this. As we understood that government was 
too big, in 1996 we started a comprehensive privatisa-
tion programme. Government owned and ran a lot of 
businesses, and even three hotels. We privatised all the 
hotels, and set up the tourism industry. Up to then the 
government had "owned" the tourism sector, losing a lot 
of money every year; since they were privatised these 
hotels have done a fabulous job. We should give the pri-
vate sector the space to move and the freedom to think 
and to work things out. The government must be the 
facilitator in terms of tax measures, import levies, labour 
issues. In a few words, for me, the best government is the 
least government. 
In 1999, we were the first to look at the pearl industry 
as a viable alternative for the economy. I brought two 
technicians from Japan to look into cultured pearls. At 
that time the only place in the world where this type of 
oyster grew naturally was Tahiti. These technicians said 
that there were two or three lagoons that were ideal for 
farming. The industry has now made much progress. 
As for the fishing industry, it was my government that 
put money in reserves for the development of this sector; 
this money has now been used by the current govern-
ment to launch the new fishing industry. But, obviously, 
they don't give me credit for this. 
In economic policy there are many differences 
between the opposition and the ruling 
coalition. What about social issues? 
We both believe in some sort of social equity: we are 
very similar on this issue. But in terms of creating a 
balance in the economy, the main island Rarotonga vis-
à-vis our sister islands, we were the first to start the so-
called "devolution programme", where we devolved to 
local councils the authority to run their own affairs, to 
make decisions on their own destiny. We have been 
colonising our sister islands for a long time. We have 
been imposing Rarotongan culture, which is European 
culture inherited from New Zealand and European 
countries, on the sister islands. But each island has a dis-
tinctive culture, customs, dialects, and different tradi-
tional structures to manage political and social issues. 
People must have a say and rather than sitting back and 
waiting fot government to supply them everything, they 
should decide on their own. 
Another way to foster popular participation is 
through non-state actors. It seems that in the 
past your government did not have a positive 
attitude towards these organisations. Is that 
true? 
No, I don't think so. Let me give you an example: the 
process of putting the budget together. I created a 
national development council comprising representa-
tives from the NGOs, church groups, private sector 
organisations, where for the first time I was trying to get 
a consensus across society about the budget. 
Back in the mid-1990s, NGOs were regarded as for-
eign organisations: they did not belong here, they were 
accused of being an outpost of some foreign institu-
tion existing somewhere else. The real NGOs were not 
seen as NGOs while in reality they were. For instance, 
I established several NGOs: the Religious Advisory 
Council, the National Women's Council. Although 
NGOs say we did not hand them money, they did get 
it indirectly through international development assis-
tance provided to the Cook Islands. When we negoti-
ated with donors, we told them that if they did not feel 
satisfied with government performance in managing 
aid resources, they could certainly provide these 
resources directly to NGOs. It is true that NGOs 
haven't received as much money as they would have 
liked. But I feel that NGOs sometimes rely too much 
on government. Also, if government gives money, 
there is no way it won't ask them to be accountable for 
every penny spent. That surely changes the relation-
ship, but not in the sense that government wants to 
manipulate them. NGOs have to make a choice: if 
they get money from government they must be 
accountable to tax payers. ■ MC Cook Islands 
"Civil society is finally acknowledged 
as a partner in the development process 
Despite the small population, according to estimates there are more than 
150 civil society organisations currently operating in the Cook Islands. 
Yet, governments for a long time denied them a role in the development 
process. In the past few years the situation seems to have changed. 
II 
If \Λ/θ Consider the average Cook Islander, he or she 
would probably belong to one religious charity, one sports 
group, one youth organisation, one cultural association, and 
at least one welfare non-governmental organisation (NGO); 
furthermore, an average woman would also be part of one, 
or even more, of the many women's associations. 
However, despite this great deal of people's activism, 
governments have shown a tepid attitude towards civil 
society. "Governments for a long time have not acknowl-
edged that civil society is an equal partner in the devel-
opment process. They did not want to see what we were 
doing on the ground, probably because they considered 
us a threat. For this reason, most of the NGOs have 
never received any support: assistance was limited only 
to three NGOs, operating in women's, youth and sports 
issues. Still, the civil society sector grew, mostly thanks to 
the support of international donors and regional 
NGOs", explains Vereara Maeva, president of the Cook 
Islands Association of NGOs (CIANGO). 
Increasing role for civil society 
Officially established in 1995 (even though it started 
being operative already in 1986), CLANGO is the 
national umbrella for all NGOs in the Cook Islands. 
CLANGO has become increasingly visible not only in 
local politics but also by representing Cook Islands' civil 
society in several meetings and conferences around the 
world. Nevertheless, not all groups are affiliated to 
CLANGO: "This is probably because sometimes NGOs 
prefer to deal with governments either directly or 
through their sectoral coordinating bodies", believes Ms 
Maeva. 
Among sectoral NGOs, the Rarotonga Environmental 
Awareness Programme (REAP) and the Taporoporoanga 
Ipukarea Society (TIS) are among the most active NGOs 
in environmental issues. Through a major public cam-
paign, REAP and TIS were able to stop a new bill, 
accused of over-regulating and over-controlling the envi-
ronmental field in a "standardised Rarotongan fashion", 
without leaving any freedom to the individual islands to 
make decisions on their own affairs. 
As for women's issues, a great role in advancing gender 
equality throughout the years has been played by the 
National Council of Women (NCW), established in 
1984. As a result of the close and good relationship 
between the NCW and the Government Division for 
Women's Affairs, not only has the condition of women 
improved a lot, but women are also now much more 
involved in key decision-making processes. 
These two sectoral examples, together with the activism 
of CLANGO, show that the attitude of governments 
towards NGOs has changed in the past few years. "In 2001, 
as government started realising that we were doing a good 
job, they provided us with some assistance fot the first time 
ever. Even though CLANGO has not received any financial 
assistance in the past two years, I believe that the current 
government is doing a good job in involving small groups 
through projects. I am happy with that", says Ms Maeva. 
Consulted under Cotonou 
This change of attitude is con-
firmed by the fact that the Minister 
of Internal Affairs is now in charge 
of coordinating all efforts in the 
NGO sector, but also by the fact 
that NGOs are widely consulted 
on national development priori-
ties. "One clear example of this 
new attitude is the process which 
led to the adoption of the Country 
Strategy Paper in the framework of 
the Cotonou Agreement. CLAN-
GO is in charge of representing 
local NGOs with the Cotonou 
Agreement. We have been very 
involved. We were not happy with 
the original version of the development strategy. Then we 
submitted our inputs and when they sent us back the final 
paper, I was very happy to see that most of our concerns 
were taken into account," comments Ms Maeva. 
By growing in importance, NGOs face new challenges: 
"Donors have become more stringent and they want us 
to be more accountable. Sometimes they ask too much: if 
I have to write reports, talk to people coming from over-
seas, my work at CLANGO suffers. Many NGOs need to 
be strengthened in their capacities, otherwise we cannot 
do our job properly", concludes Ms Maeva. ■ MC 
Vereara Maeva, president of the 
Cook Islands Association of NGOs 
(CIANGO). „country report: Cook Islands 
Improving opportunities for people in 
the outer islands: the EU contribution 
Despite the fact that the Cook Islands has made substantial progress towards 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, there is still great 
disparity between the main and the outer islands. The resources provided under 
the framework of the Cotonou Agreement are intended to fill this gap, 
addressing in particular two sectors: health and education. 
Generally we do not associate poverty with the Cook 
Islands. The last Pacific Human Development Report, in 
fact, indicated that the Cook Islands scores very high in 
the Human Development Index and its Poverty Index is 
among the lowest in the Pacific. These two indexes 
reflect the high life expectancy, a relatively low percent-
age of child mortality (as well as decreasing maternal 
mortality rates), a nearly universal literacy rate, a zero 
percentage of people without access to health services, 
and a relatively low percentage of children under five 
years of age who are underweight. 
However, these achievements do not mean that all 
inhabitants enjoy the same standards of living. The 
financial and logistical problems of serving scattered 
islands with low populations have resulted in significant 
disparities between the main island, where about 60 per 
cent of the population resides, and the outer islands. 
Outer island development 
Apart from Aitutaki, with a growing tourism sector, 
and Manihiki, with an expanding black pearl industry, 
in all other islands business opportunities are very limit-
ed. If prior to the public sector downsizing in the mid 
1990s, three quarters of the workforce was employed by 
the government, as a result of those cuts most families 
have no stable income. The immediate consequence was 
both internal migration from the outer islands to 
Rarotonga and external migration from the Cook Islands 
to overseas destinations, mainly New Zealand. This 
migration severely affected the maintenance of efficient 
social services, such as hospitals and schools, in most of 
the outer islands. 
Several initiatives have been promoted over the years 
to reduce such disparities, but no substantial results have 
yet been achieved. "In the 1970s and 1980s there was a 
lot of development in the outer islands, mostly in terms 
of improving infrastructure and transportation facilities, 
but over the years we lost the original impetus. It is true, 
there has always been an outer island policy in the pro-
gramme of each government, but we always lacked the 
ability and the resources to implement those policies. 
Recently, the situation seems to have changed and more 
emphasis has been placed on implementing policies", 
explains Wilkie Rasmussen, a Membet of Parliament 
from Penrhyn, one of the smallest islands. 
The current government has been praised for develop-
ing a more comprehensive policy, but still most of the 
In the Cook Islands there are few signs of absolute poverty: this may be 
due to the informal support network that exists within extended families in 
Polynesian societies. 
communities living in the outer islands complain about 
inadequate budget allocations. Income-generating 
opportunities are now promoted through a new business 
scheme and a development fund. Infrastructure develop-
ment such as harbour development, upgrading of airport 
runways, water and roads, health clinics and education 
facilities are to be supported through donor funded proj-
ects. Indeed, more than 20 per cent of the current bilat-
eral New Zealand aid programme and the entire cooper-
ation programme of the European Community are 
devoted to development in the outer islands. 
Donor activities 
Aid flows in recent years have stabilised at around 
US$5.5 million per year. New Zealand, even though its 
annual assistance has dropped in the past few years, 
remains the dominant donor, providing almost half of 
total international assistance. "This assistance is due to 
the historical links we have with the Cook Islands", says 
Kurt Meyer, High Commissioner for New Zealand. "In 
the past years, we have decided to stop supporting the 
recurrent costs of the Cook Islands' budget: we no longer 
provide budgetary aid, but only project aid." 
Australia is the next largest bilateral donor. Most of its 
assistance programme focuses on education and train-
ing. The aim is to boost the workforce's skills and 
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Islands need for greater self-reliance. 
As for multilateral assistance, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) is the major multilateral donor. ADB's strat-
egy focuses on building capacitities in sound economic 
and public sector management, promotion of economic 
growth, and supporting private sector development. 
Several UN agencies are represented in the Cook Islands, 
but they provide small amounts of aid. UNDP for exam-
ple has now started two new programmes, dealing with 
biodiversity and information and technology. 
EU cooperation 
The Cook Islands had been trying to join the EU-
ACP partnership since the late 1980s. However, as sev-
eral concerns were raised about the real independence of 
the country from New Zealand, especially in terms of its 
foreign policy, the Cook Islands was allowed to join the 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement only in 2000. The area 
of cooperation chosen for the 9th EDF programme is 
"Outer Island Development", with particular emphasis 
on the improvement of social services. 
"Even though our relationship with the EU is really in 
its infancy, I can make two provisional observations", 
comments Edwin Pittman, secretary at the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and National Authorising Officer 
(NAO). "First, the process of drawing up the Country 
Strategy Papers and the National Indicative Programme 
was somewhat bureaucratic and sometimes we experi-
enced difficulty in getting a clear understanding of what 
rules and regulations might be applicable. Second, I 
must also say that the entire process was a real partner-
ship. Sometimes the European Commission felt that 
resources could be put in certain areas, we said our pri-
orities were elsewhere: it was a very cooperative process." 
As for education, EU assistance will be mainly direct-
ed to those islands that face problems in recruiting qual-
ified teachers, to upgrade the skills of teachers, and to 
buy new accessories. Education standards in the outer 
islands have indeed gone down. As an example, the 
results of the 2000 Standard Tests of Achievement for 
English competency for primary schools were 6.21 for 
A portion of EU development assistance will be used to improve school 
infrastractures, including renovation of buildings and supply of learning 
equipment. 
Among the outer islands, the most southerly one, Mangaia, has a rich past, 
witnessed by the numerous caves at the inner edge of the island's central 
formation. Before the arrival of missionaries, some tribes were engaged in inter-
tribal warfare which was followed by the cultural ritual of cannibalism. Eating the 
victims of warfare was supposed to increase the prestige of successful warriors. 
Rarotonga, 4.67 for the southern islands, and 3.38 for 
the northern islands. "If on the one hand the Cook 
Islands education system is considered to be one of the 
best in the Pacific region in terms of access, we still need 
to work to improve the quality of the teaching, especial-
ly in the outer islands. The majority of the teachers at 
primary level don't have a university degree but only a 
certificate; very few teachers at secondary level have it. 
The small population in most of the outer islands 
implies two things: first, not all grades have their own 
teachers; second, if we don't need to build more schools, 
we certainly lack modern accessories, such as computers 
and other technological tools", explains Ken Matheson, 
secretary of the Ministry of Education. 
As for the health sector, part of the EU resources will 
be devoted to constructing and upgrading clinical infra-
structures and part to address the shortage of medical 
equipment and qualified personnel. "In the past, most of 
the resources allocated for health were used in Rarotonga. 
The money provided by the EU will be used to allow the 
outer islands get more resources. We want to make sure 
that people are looked after properly in each of the outer 
islands. In the past some islands had only a nurse; now 
every island has at least one doc-
tor, and periodically some spe-
cialists visit patients on the 
islands. But buying and main-
taining new medical equipment 
is essential to treat patients bet-
ter: that is where our greatest 
need is at the moment", says 
Vaine Teokotai, secretary general 
at the Ministry of Health. 
In this sense, "EU assistance is 
most welcome as it is complemen-
tary to that of New Zealand. The 
EU concentrates on health and 
education budget support, while 
New Zealand, which provides 
project aid, focuses on the same 
issues, but only on maintenance 
of building as they don't buy 
equipment. The EU money, thus, 
can be used for this purpose", 
concludes Marama Anguna, act-
ing manager at the Aid Mana-
gement Division. ■ MC 
The EU development pro-
gramme for the Cook 
Islands will be financed 
through: a) an allocation 
of €2.0 million, which will 
cover development opera-
tions within the frame-
work of the support strate-
gy; b) an allocation of €0.6 
million, which will be 
mobilised to provide addi-
tional support arising from 
unforeseen needs, such as 
emergency assistance. 
Support to Outer Islands 
Development will absorb 
most of the allocation 
(85%), while the rest 
(15%) will be earmarked 
for activities implemented 
by non-state actors. The 
Cook Islands will also ben-
efit from the Pacific Islands 
Regional Indicative Pro-
gramme and from specific 
trade operations. 
n°200 september-october 2003 the Courier ACP-EU © _prof¡le 
Cook Islands 
General Information 
Area: 
Population: 
Capital: 
Major islands: 
Religions: 
Languages: 
240 sq km. 
13,400(2001 census). 
Avarua (on Rarotonga). 
Rarotonga, Aitutaki, Atiu, Rarotonga, Aitutaki, Mangia, Pukapuka, Atiu, Manihiki, 
Penrhyn. 
Christian. 
English (official), Cook Islands Maori. 
Political structure 
Constitutional status: 
Constitution: 
Executive branch: 
Legislative branch: 
Political parties: 
Legal system: 
Economy 
Currency: 
GDP per capita: 
GDP growth rate: 
Inflation rate: 
GDP composition by sector: 
Social Indicators 
Population growth rate: 
Life expectancy at birth: 
Infant mortality rate: 
Population urbanised: 
Adult literacy: 
Population with access 
to safe water: 
Population using adequate 
sanitation facilities: 
Self-governing in free association with New Zealand. 
4 August 1965. 
The Queen of the United Kingdom, Elisabeth II, represented by a Governor 
General, is the head of State. Following the elections, the leader of the majority 
party or the leader of the majority coalition usually becomes prime minister. 
The Cook Islands has a 24-member Parliament elected for five years by universal 
adult suffrage. A seat representing Cook Islanders overseas has just been 
dropped. The House of Ariki, composed of 21 hereditary chiefs, has advisory 
functions on traditional and customary matters. 
Cook Islands Party (CIP), Democratic Alliance Party (DAP), New Alliance Party (NAP), 
Cook Islands National Party (CIN). 
Based on New Zealand law and English common law. 
New Zealand dollar (1 €=2 NZ$). 
$5,000, purchasing power parity (2001 est.). 
1.5% (2003 est.). 
3.9% (2002). 
agriculture: 17%; industry: 7.8%; services: 75.2% (2000). 
1% (1990-2001). 
71.5. 
20.7 (per 1,000 live births). 
59%. 
99%. 
100%. 
100%. 
Sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB), CIA World Fact Book, UNICEF, European Commission. 
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In*»«/ Unito«/ Kingdom  ¡fö cV^ 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
I Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
Territorial collectivities 
Mayotte 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
Overseas territories 
New Caledonia 
and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
territories 
Wallis and Futuna islands 
Netherlands 
Overseas countries 
Netherlands Antilles: 
Bonaire, Curacao, St Martin, 
Saba, St Eustache 
Aruba 
Denmark 
Country having special 
relations with Denmark 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
Overseas countries and territories 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St Helena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Marthall islands 
Cook 
Tonga Niu» llanda 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central Africar 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Cook Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba* 
Democratic Re 
Djibouti 
Cuba was admitted 
Republic 
public of 
as a new π 
Congo 
lember of the ACP gre 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
East Timor 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
up in December 2000, but is no 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Marshall islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Patau 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Samoa 
General Secretariat of the ACP Group of Sutes: Avenue Georges Henri 451, 1200 Brussels, Belgium. Telephone: +32 2 743 0600 
This li« docs not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future. The Courier uses maps from a variety of st 
São'lomé and Principe-
Senega I 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
t prejudice the status of any state or territory. Published by the Directorate General for Development, 
European Commission, 
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